

Chapter 6

Post-Cold War Strategies

Supplemental Vignettes

Comparison of Post-Cold War Strategies

Table 1. Summary of Alternative Post-Cold War Strategies

	Principal Objectives	Basic Premises	Preferred Political and Military Instruments
Homeland Defense	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> -defense of the homeland first -protect <i>vital</i> interests narrowly defined 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> -promoting values generates resentment -economic well-being best left to private sector -intervention causes trouble -alliances pre-obligate -domestic primacy -resources are scarce -fully attentive, not engaged 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> -little internationalism -restrictive unilateralism -small naval expeditionary force -modest air and missile defense -strong intelligence -strong nuclear second strike
Selective Engagement	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> -peace between great powers -prevent proliferation to ambitious powers 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> -any great-power war in Eurasia is threat to US -states balance against power -public won't support global peace duties -resources are scarce 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> -selective unilateralism -traditional alliances -two major theater war force -strong nuclear second strike
Cooperative Security	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> -preserve global peace -develop credible international institutions -prevent proliferation 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> -little concern for great power conflict -peace is indivisible -even small WMD wars must be prevented -states will subordinate interests and forces -US military superiority must be maintained 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> -internationalism -economic sanctions -arms control regimes -reconnaissance strike force -complement to international forces -strong nuclear second strike
Primacy	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> -preserve US preponderance -preserve global freedom of action 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> -preponderance of power assures world peace -states balance against threat -force used prudently will assure benign appearance -military power builds economic power 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> -unilateralism -traditional alliances -two-power force -strong overseas presence -strong nuclear second strike

Post-Cold War Force Drawdown




Figure 1. Post-Cold War Force Drawdown

Southern Lebanon 1996

Southern Lebanon 1996

The Israeli occupation of Lebanon flared in spring of 1996. An Israeli missile killed two in Lebanon 30 March, and Hezbollah responded by launching 20 missiles into Israel. A roadside bomb killed a Lebanese boy on 9 April, and Hezbollah responded with 30 missiles. On 11 April, Israel initiated Operation Grapes of Wrath with large-scale artillery and aerial bombardment. Lebanese ports were blockaded; power plants and bridges were destroyed. Close to half a million fled. Some 800 Lebanese had taken refuge in the UN compound at Qana, and over 100 were killed in an Israeli artillery barrage 18 April. The UN Security Council, with US support, called for a ceasefire 18 April. Through American diplomacy, an Israeli-Lebanese ceasefire agreement was reached and announced 26 April and became effective the next day.

The 9/11 Attacks

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On 11 September 2001, four commercial jet liners departed from Boston, Newark, and the District of Columbia laden with fuel for Los Angeles. They were quickly hijacked and diverted to targets in New York and the nation's capital. The concept for the attacks was born of a Baluch from Kuwait. Approval came from a Saudi, and the \$400,000 to \$500,000 funding came from Saudi and Kuwaiti sources. Details, including targeting, were finalized in a meeting outside Barcelona. The thirteen "muscle" hijackers—twelve Saudi and one Emirati—trained in Afghanistan. The four pilots were Saudi, Egyptian, Emirati, and Lebanese. Flight training, surveillance flights, and test flights were conducted within the United States. Principals include Osama bin Laden, Khalid Sheik Mohammed, Ayman al-Zawahiri, and Mohamed Atta's Hamburg group.

The 9/11 Commission labeled Kahlid Sheikh Mohammed (KSM) a "terrorist entrepreneur." Linked through his nephew, Ramsey Yousef, to the 1993 World Trade Center bombing and other terrorist activities, KSM, with the US in pursuit, abruptly left Qatar in 1996 for Karachi, Pakistan. KSM briefed UBL on several concepts, including "planes operations" at a meeting in Tora Bora in mid-1996. UBL recalled the burning towers in Lebanon and approved the concept in late 1998 or early 1999. Enjoying his independence, KSM joined al-Qaeda and moved to Kandahar only after UBL demonstrated his will to attack the United States with the East African embassy bombings in 1998. In a spring 1999 meeting near Kandahar, UBL approved a more detailed plan, including initial target selection, and agreed to provide hijackers, pilots, and funding.

Independently, four Western educated men living in Germany began to form what later would be called the Hamburg group. Mohamed Atta arrived in 1992. He was angry with the repressive government of Egypt, its peace with Israel, and its alignment with the United States. Three of the future hijackers rented an apartment in Hamburg on 1 November 1998. As the clique solidified it became more militant. The group, including Mohamed Atta and Ramzi bin al-Shibh, ventured to Afghanistan to train for jihad in Chechnya, but chance encounters led them to UBL who recognized the opportunity to exploit their unique talents. Three of the four 9/11 pilots came from this group. Unable to obtain the necessary documentation to enter the United States, the fourth member, Ramzi bin al-Shibh, became an intermediary between UBL, KSM, and the Hamburg group's leader, Mohamed Atta.

With meetings and preparations conducted around the globe, the initial US response was to invade Afghanistan to displace the Taliban and to disrupt al-Qaeda. Displacing the Taliban came quickly and al-Qaeda operations were seriously disrupted, but UBL escaped. Installing a government willing and able to deny sanctuary would take more time, more troops, and more money.

Southern Lebanon 2006

Southern Lebanon 2006

Hezbollah hoped to capture Israeli soldiers to exchange for four Lebanese soldiers that Israel had previously agreed to return. Hezbollah launched missiles into Israel from southern Lebanon 12 July as a diversion for its ground assault and capture of two Israeli soldiers. Israel responded with overwhelming force beginning with artillery and air strikes. Israel attacked and closed the Beirut airport, blockaded seaports, and closed the main road to Damascus to prevent the captives from being removed from Lebanon. Hezbollah missile launching sites were destroyed. Israeli ground forces crossed over into southern Lebanon on 23 July. Hezbollah launched 4000 rockets into Israel, many into population centers. Civilian casualties and displacements were significant. Cluster munitions were used in Lebanon and remained as unexploded ordnance. Both sides suffered; both sides claimed victory.

Lebanon, unable to control southern Lebanon, pleaded to the UN Security Council for a ceasefire on 15 July. Secretary Rice and US Ambassador to the UN John Bolton unequivocally reject a ceasefire, and the US sold jet fuel to support Israeli operations. AIPAC influence was alleged. An eventual UN-brokered ceasefire began 14 August. Israel lifted its naval blockade 8 September.

Al-Qaida's Casus Belli

Al-Qaeda's Casus Belli

In 1996, Usamah bin Muhammed bin Awad bin Ladin declared war on Americans occupying the Arabian Peninsula, the land of two holy mosques.¹ Bin Laden made explicit his casus belli. Former CIA station chief for al-Qaeda, Michael Scheuer, lists six US policies considered by bin Laden to be anti-Islamic.²

- US support for Israel that keeps Palestinians in the Israelis' thrall.
- US and other Western troops on the Arabian Peninsula.
- US occupation of Iraq and Afghanistan.
- US support for Russia, India, and China against their Muslim militants.
- US pressure on Arab energy producers to keep oil prices low.
- US support for apostate, corrupt, and tyrannical Muslim governments.

¹ *Al-Islah*, London, 2 September 1996, 1-12.

² Anonymous (Michael Scheuer), *Imperial Hubris: Why the West is Losing the War on Terror* (Washington, D.C.: Brassey's, 2004), 241.