

# Commander's Handbook for the Joint Interagency Coordination Group



**United States Joint Forces Command**

**Joint Warfighting Center**

**Joint Innovation &  
Experimentation Directorate**

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
## MESSAGE TO JOINT WARFIGHTERS


During the past six years, members of the joint community have continued to evolve their understanding of interagency coordination and its impact on planning and conducting joint operations. This evolution has been accomplished by engaging in healthy debate and practical application, which we as a community believe is critical for vetting new ideas before we accept them into joint doctrine.

Combatant commands and subordinate joint forces are using these constructs and prototypes in many real world and exercise environments. Joint interagency coordination groups (JIACGs) have been implemented in nearly every combatant command and in some cases their use and role is being expanded much beyond that of their original charter.

As US Joint Forces Command continues to interact with the combatant commands and Services, we recognize that there is not universal agreement on the specific use of the JIACG and other related interagency coordination ideas. We have developed this handbook to provide our perspective and a common, practical baseline for continuing the evolution of the JIACG. While we believe this handbook contains “best practices,” this handbook is not doctrine. It is, however, an important product that will help us capture good ideas and practices that will enable us to expand and improve the discussion of JIACGs in Joint Publication 3-08, *Interagency, Intergovernmental Organization, and Nongovernmental Organization Coordination During Joint Operations*.

This handbook was developed for the combatant commanders, subordinate joint force commanders, and their staffs to advance the conduct of joint operations.

  
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# PREFACE

## 1. Scope

The *Commander's Handbook for the Joint Interagency Coordination Group* provides techniques and procedures that are evolving in the joint community and being incorporated into joint publications.

## 2. Purpose

This handbook serves as a bridge between the evolving JIACG and its migration into doctrine. As such, it is intended to inform doctrine writers, educators, and trainers about the JIACG and its potential for further inclusion in joint doctrine, education, and training. It fills the existing void between emerging concepts and published joint doctrine. It also presents well developed definitions that have been harmonized with current and evolving joint doctrine and discusses those “best practices” that have proven of value during on-going military operations, exercises, and experimentation. This handbook provides potential joint and Service users a definitive publication on “how” a JIACG may be organized and employed to support interagency coordination at the operational level, particularly during the planning and execution of a joint operation.

## 3. Application

The handbook is meant to educate the joint community about the JIACG and to offer some useful techniques and procedures that can be used in the combatant commands by joint force commanders and their staffs. The handbook focuses on JIACG coordination of interagency efforts in deploying and employing joint forces in concert with the other instruments of national power.

## 4. Command

The recommendations in this handbook are based on best practices observed during current operations, exercises, experimentation, and prototyping, as well as existing joint doctrine. Commanders may tailor specific elements to conform to their individual staff requirements.

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## EXECUTIVE SUMMARY COMMANDER'S OVERVIEW

- **Complements and supplements - rather than supplants - extant joint doctrine for interagency coordination at the operational level.**
- **Establishes the joint interagency coordination group (JIACG) as a resource for the combatant commanders (CCDRs) to collaborate with United States Government (USG) agencies and departments.**
- **Describes the complexities of USG multiagency versus single agency coordination in joint operations.**
- **Discusses the expanding capability of the JIACG to manage actions extending across the range of military operations.**
- **Emphasizes close and continuous interagency coordination and cooperation to mitigate confusion over objectives, inadequate structure or procedures, and bureaucratic and/or personnel limitations.**
- **Establishes a frame of reference by clarifying and identifying common terms with clear and specific usage.**
- **Provides a baseline for JIACG employment.**

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The *Commander's Handbook for the Joint Interagency Coordination Group* provides the detail necessary for CCDRs, their staffs, and interagency partners to understand and apply the JIACG as a capability enabling the conduct of operational level interagency coordination. **Chapter I** establishes the joint context in which the JIACG will support operations at the operational level. **Chapter II** discusses the interagency coordination framework and the role the JIACG will play in bridging the gap between non-Department of Defense USG agency and military planning efforts for a potential crisis. **Chapter III** covers the organization and structure of the JIACG and the expansion of its role in joint and multinational activities across the range of military operations. **Chapter IV** discusses how the JIACG can enhance the CCDRs' flexibility and adaptation during execution, particularly in security cooperation and joint operation planning. Finally, **Appendices A, B, C, D, and the Glossary** provide, respectively, a JIACG planning checklist, Universal Joint Task List tasks related to interagency coordination, position descriptions and qualifications of selected JIACG personnel, a list of primary references used in the development of this handbook, and a compendium of abbreviations and definitions.

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## Joint Context

Today's adversaries include both state and non-state actors that operate within a federation of networked, complex, adaptive systems that extend beyond geographic boundaries. In joint operations, one of the key capabilities needed to achieve cooperation is the enhanced integration of the instruments of national power. **Crises are such that no single organization, department, or agency has the necessary resources, authority, or expertise to single-handedly provide an effective response.** At the operational level, the need for enhanced interagency coordination prompted the establishment of JIACGs.

## Cooperation Requirement

Unlike the military, most USG agencies are not equipped and organized to create separate staffs at all levels of war. **Whereas the military is prepared to coordinate at the strategic, operational, and tactical levels, USG agencies and departments are more apt to operate at the strategic level in Washington, DC, and in the field at the tactical level. For example, although some regional coordination and projects occur to some extent within the bureaus of the Department of State (DOS) and US Agency for International Development (USAID), detailed regional operational planning is less common.** This disparity complicates coordination efforts at the operational level and may require military staffs interacting with interagency representatives at multiple levels. The JIACG at the operational level can potentially mitigate the effects of this problem.

## JIACG Role

The primary role of the JIACG is to enhance interagency coordination. **The JIACG is a fully integrated participant on the CCDRs staff with a daily focus on joint strategic planning with its three subsets: security cooperation planning, joint operation planning, and force planning.** It provides a capability specifically organized to enhance situational awareness of interagency activities to prevent undesired consequences and uncoordinated activity.

JIACGs, with limited capabilities, were fielded in the combatant commands to address the challenges of the ongoing war on terrorism. **JIACGs have moved beyond the strictly counterterrorism arena and are emerging as collaborative-enabled, multi-disciplined teams that support military engagement, security cooperation, deterrence activities, as well as operations ranging from crisis response and limited contingency operations to, if necessary, major operations and campaigns.** This advisory element on the CCDR's staff facilitates information sharing and coordinated action across the interagency community. **However, the JIACG does not make policy, task, or replace existing lines of authority or reporting.**

## Employment

The JIACG has a small full-time core element consisting primarily of USG civilian personnel with extensive interagency experience. The core element is an important contributor in providing guidance, facilitation, coordination, and synchronization of interagency equities in the area of responsibility (AOR). **It is a separate staff directorate or element of approximately 12 personnel with a capability of being augmented with virtual or additional collocated members.** Key interagency participants in the AOR are the US missions which includes the US ambassadors/chiefs of mission, country teams, defense attaché offices, and the security assistance offices; foreign policy advisor/political advisor; interagency executive steering council; DOS, Office of the Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization; Standing Joint Force Headquarters (Core Element); Joint Force Coordination Authority for Stability Operations; and the USAID/Office of Foreign Disaster Assistance.

**A major enabler to interagency connectivity is the JIACG's use of collaboration tools with the combatant command staff, each member's home headquarters, and other USG departments and agencies not represented on the combatant command staff.** Collaboration provides the ease of communication and the depth of detail that is the life-blood of JIACG employment. It enhances efforts in developing and maintaining habitual relationships with key civilian individuals, organizations and agencies that can provide specific expertise. A robust, established reach-back capability that leverages collaborative technology allows the JIACG to maintain these relationships during operations, reducing the need for a large forward command and control footprint.

**CCDRs should ensure that interagency concerns, priorities, and requirements are included in any exercise or training plan.** Mission-based training improves vertical and horizontal communication, identifies seams and friction points, ensures combat readiness of individual and collective skills in the event of a crisis and develops and maintains key staff and component informational relationships necessary for effective crisis action planning and execution. The integration and linkage of the JIACG to external partners and the combatant command staff provides an opportunity to train together and develop working relationships essential to efficient staff work and successful joint operations.

## The Way Ahead

The JIACG represents an important capability - thinking and operating collaboratively using networked systems and providing an interagency perspective in response to the operational environment. **The vision of the JIACG is to improve relationships and leverage technology to enable analysis, understanding, coordination, and execution of unified actions.** The JIACG is set to be the means for enhancing combatant command readiness by improving the pace and quality of interagency coordination and execution at the operational level.

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# CHAPTER I

## JOINT CONTEXT

*“Liaison organizations such as a JIACG can help promote interaction and cooperation among diverse agencies. . . . The goal - to develop and promote the unity of effort needed to accomplish a specific mission - can be achieved by establishing an atmosphere of trust and cooperation.”*

**Joint Publication 3-0, *Joint Operations***

### 1. Introduction

a. This handbook is a follow-on to the Joint Warfighting Center’s Joint Doctrine Series Pamphlet 6, *Doctrinal Implications of the Joint Interagency Coordination Group (JIACG)*, and presents major aspects of enhancing interagency coordination at the strategic and operational levels by establishing and organizing JIACGs at the combatant commands. It is intended to provide sufficient detail to help combatant commanders (CCDRs), subordinate joint force commanders (JFCs), their staffs, and interagency partners understand the JIACG as a capability to enable the coordination of all instruments of national power with joint operations. While the JIACG described in this handbook focuses primarily on JFCs and their staffs, it also should be of interest to subordinate commanders within a joint force and to all interagency partners.

b. Faced with challenges to national interests, the United States, along with its multinational partners, can respond by using the capabilities resident in one or more of the instruments of national power (diplomatic, informational, military, and economic). US military operations typically are conducted within a framework that includes interagency, intergovernmental organizations (IGOs), nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), and multinational partners. A strategic, top-down approach aligns and harmonizes a variety of ways and means with a set of desired strategic ends. These ends provide the fundamental purpose and context for committing the military and other instruments of national power. Joint operations should, therefore, always be conducted within the context of unified action in support of a strategic end state. Figure I-1 identifies those United States Government (USG) agencies with which CCDRs have frequent interaction or that a deployed joint force may encounter during the course of military operations.

#### KEY TERM

**Unified Action.** A broad generic term that describes the wide scope of actions (including the synchronization and/or integration of joint or multinational military operations with the activities of local, state, and federal government agencies and intergovernmental and nongovernmental organizations) taking place within unified commands, subordinate unified commands, or joint task forces under the overall direction of the commanders of those commands.

**SOURCE:** JP 3-0, *Joint Operations*

For further information on key USG agencies, departments, their organization and core competencies, refer to Joint Publication (JP) 3-08, Interagency, Intergovernmental Organization, and Nongovernmental Organization Coordination During Joint Operations, Vol I and Vol II.




Figure I-1. Integrating the Interagency Community

c. The global civil-military environment calls for increased and efficient organizational connectivity between and among the myriad organizations performing their roles as part of the instruments of national power to achieve national strategic objectives. Joint operations draw upon increased numbers of countries, regional organizations, USG agencies, IGOs, corporate activities, and NGOs. This environment creates challenges to effective interagency coordination by engaged interagency partners often having conflicting policies and procedures which further complicates efforts at achieving unity of effort. Typically, each agency develops its own agency-specific plans at varying levels of detail in response to an issue or event. **The challenge to the interagency community is to take single agency planning efforts and meld them into a collaborative,**

**multiagency planning process that exploits the core competencies of all the interagency partners.** Figure I-2 shows the complexities of multiagency planning versus single agency planning.




Figure I-2. United States Government Operational Level Planning

d. The JIACG, with its tools, processes and procedures, is an important step in the overall Department of Defense (DOD) effort to strengthen its capability to conduct joint operations. The current Joint Staff (JS) effort is to field a permanent JIACG capability for each combatant command that expands initial capabilities beyond the counterterrorism arena. **The JIACG will support the entire range of military operations.**

## 2. Operational Environment

a. Today's adversaries, including both state and non-state actors, can operate within a federation of networked, complex, adaptive systems that extend beyond geographic boundaries. Unified action - joint, interagency, and multinational - is essential to effectively meet the challenges of these adaptive, networked adversaries. Joint and multinational operations against contemporary adversaries require unified action in planning and execution with interagency and multinational partners who are not under US military command authority. This effort depends on building and sharing a common understanding of the strategic purpose and end state; developing relevant objectives; a common understanding of the operational environment; and harmonization of the actions required to resolve the problem.

**KEY TERM**

**Operational Environment.** A composite of the conditions, circumstances, and influences that affect the employment of capabilities and bear on the decisions of the commander.

**SOURCE:** JP 3-0, *Joint Operations*

b. Typical characterizations of the operational environment include:

(1) **Permissive environment** - the operational environment in which the host country military and law enforcement agencies have control as well as the intent and capability to assist operations that a unit intends to conduct.

(2) **Uncertain environment** - the operational environment in which the host government forces, whether opposed to or receptive to operations that a unit intends to conduct, do not have totally effective control of the territory and population in the intended operational area.

(3) **Hostile environment** - the operational environment in which hostile forces have control as well as the intent and capability to effectively oppose or react to the operations a unit intends to conduct.

c. The operational environment includes the air, land, maritime, space, and associated adversary, friendly, and neutral systems (e.g., political, military, economic, social, informational, infrastructure, and others) that are relevant to a specific joint operation, regardless of geographic boundaries. Friendly forces seek to develop a common understanding of the operational environment among members of the joint, interagency, and multinational team, thereby facilitating unity of effort. A common perspective provides the Ccdr a more comprehensive picture of the challenges and the best balance of capabilities to shape the environment. For JFCs, this perspective increases the fidelity of joint operation planning and operational design.

d. **The development of a systems perspective of the operational environment requires analysis of its relevant systems and their interrelationships.** If a region is the focus of a developing crisis, then the systems of that region (e.g., political, military, economic, social, informational, infrastructure, and others) should be viewed holistically as a network of nation states and non-state actors. These nation states are also composed of systems that allow them to function as sovereign countries. In a joint operation, these systems and their major elements and interrelationships - the multitude of nodes and links that comprise each system - become potential "objectives" for unified action when preempting or resolving a crisis. However, it is essential to understand that some systems, particularly those involving political, economic, and social interaction, are dominated by humans, can adapt readily to actual or anticipated actions, and are not as open to observation as more static systems such as infrastructure. Thus, JFCs and staffs must expect uncertainty and supplement current intelligence with judgment and intuition.

### 3. Terminology

The establishment, employment, and evolution of the JIACG has added new terms and refined others currently in the joint and interagency lexicon. These terms are intended to clarify and define areas of emphasis, yet remain consistent with the current decision-making processes for joint operations. **While most terms are compatible with current joint doctrine, it is important to understand that new terms may be introduced by interagency partners and that some terms' definitions differ from current doctrine, and that these terms can enhance joint operations and interagency coordination.** New terms and revised definitions will be incorporated in doctrine consistent with the joint and interagency community's acceptance of the emerging construct and evolution of the JIACG. The following terms and definitions, associated with interagency coordination, are illustrative of some recently approved by the joint community. The source for each term is also identified in Part II of the Glossary.

#### KEY TERMS

**Interagency.** US Government agencies and departments, including the Department of Defense.

**Interagency Coordination.** Within the context of Department of Defense involvement, the coordination that occurs between elements of Department of Defense, and engaged US Government agencies for the purpose of achieving an objective.

**Intergovernmental Organization.** An organization created by a formal agreement (e.g. a treaty) between two or more governments. It may be established on a global, regional, or functional basis for wide-ranging or narrowly defined purposes. Formed to protect and promote national interests shared by member states. Examples include the United Nations, North Atlantic Treaty Organization, and the African Union.

**Joint Interagency Coordination Group.** An interagency staff group that establishes regular, timely, and collaborative working relationships between civilian and military operational planners. Composed of US Government civilian and military experts accredited to the combatant commander and tailored to meet the requirements of a supported combatant commander, the joint interagency coordination group provides the combatant commander with the capability to collaborate at the operational level with other US Government civilian agencies and departments.

**Nongovernmental Organization.** A private, self-governing, not-for-profit organization dedicated to alleviating human suffering; and/or promoting education, health care, economic development, environmental protection, human rights, and conflict resolution; and/or encouraging the establishment of democratic institutions and civil society.

SOURCE: JP 1-02, *Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms*

## 4. The Joint Doctrine Baseline

a. The joint doctrinal underpinnings of the JIACG are found in the two volumes of JP 3-08, *Interagency, Intergovernmental Organization, and Nongovernmental Organization Coordination During Joint Operations*. Volume I discusses the interagency, IGOs, and NGOs and provides fundamental principles and guidance to facilitate coordination between DOD and USG agencies, IGOs, NGOs, and regional organizations. Volume II describes USG agencies and departments and key IGOs and NGOs, their core competencies, basic organizational structures, and relationship, or potential relationship, with the Armed Forces of the United States.

b. Other publications, such as the three Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Manuals (CJCSM) that comprise the *Joint Operation Planning and Execution System (JOPES)*, JP 3-0, *Joint Operations*, and JP 5-0, *Joint Operation Planning*, provide additional techniques and procedures. These processes and related products represent the baseline for incorporating the JIACG into joint operation planning. The JIACG construct is intended to improve our ability to respond to the nature and challenges of today's operational environment. It builds on rather than replaces these core processes.

c. Figure I-3 highlights key processes associated with JOPES. This handbook will discuss how the JFC and staff use the JIACG to enhance situational awareness and improve planning, execution, and assessment. The handbook focuses at the strategic-theater and operational levels, particularly on the interaction and collaboration among CCDRs, subordinate joint headquarters, and their Service and functional components (the highlighted center band of Figure I-3). The establishment and employment of a JIACG can significantly improve security cooperation, contingency, and crisis action planning, and recovery and reconstitution. **The JIACG provides each CCDR with a standing capability to enhance situational awareness of interagency activities and keep the military and USG agencies and departments informed of each others efforts to prevent undesired consequences and uncoordinated USG activities.**

d. **This handbook emphasizes the development and use of the JIACG as the CCDR's lead organization for interagency coordination providing guidance, facilitation, coordination, and synchronization of interagency activities within the area of responsibility (AOR).** The JIACG will interact with Department of State (DOS), which has primary responsibility for IGOs; and the US Agency for International Development (USAID), which is the USG agency that maintains the most direct relationship with NGOs; many of which receive USAID funding to carry out programs. The JIACG will help the CCDRs and staffs gain a common picture and shared understanding of the operational environment that promotes unified action with all interagency partners.




Figure I-3. The Baseline for the Joint Interagency Coordination Group

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## CHAPTER II

### INTERAGENCY COORDINATION

*“Improving the capacity of agencies to plan, prepare, coordinate, integrate, and execute responses covering the full range of crisis contingencies and long-term challenges.*

*- We need to strengthen the capacity of departments and agencies to do comprehensive, results-oriented planning.*

*- Agencies that traditionally played only a domestic role increasingly have a role to play in our foreign and security policies. This requires us to better integrate interagency activity both at home and abroad.”*

**The National Security Strategy of the United States of America, 2006**

#### 1. Purpose

a. Interagency coordination occurs between elements of DOD and engaged USG agencies for the purpose of accomplishing an objective. The identification of appropriate military objectives and actions that support US national objectives are essential to success. The global security environment that is characterized by regional instability, failed states, increased weapons proliferation, global terrorism, and unconventional threats to US citizens, interests, and territories, requires even greater cooperation among and between USG agencies. **Many national strategic objectives require the combined and coordinated use of the diplomatic, informational, military, and economic instruments of national power supported by and coordinated with that of our multinational partners and various IGOs, NGOs, and regional security organizations.**

b. Military operations must be strategically integrated and operationally and tactically coordinated with the activities of USG agencies, regional organizations, the operations of foreign forces, and activities of various host nation (HN) agencies. In planning, executing, and assessing operations, the JFC may:

- (1) Draw on the capabilities of other organizations;
- (2) Provide capabilities to other organizations; and
- (3) Deconflict joint force activities with those of others.

c. These diverse organizations may be involved in all six phases (shape, deter, seize the initiative, dominate, stabilize, and enable civil authority) of joint operations. The roles and relationships among agencies/departments, combatant commands, US state and local governments, and overseas with US embassy country teams, must be understood. **The JIACG provides the critical linkage between the military and engaged USG agencies that allow the coordinated application of all instruments of national power.** Successful interagency coordination enables the USG to build support, conserve resources, and conduct coherent operations that efficiently achieve shared goals.

## 2. Coordination Requirement

a. The number of operations requiring interagency coordination has expanded recently. During the Cold War, ideological divisions prevented the United Nations (UN) and other organizations from preventing or ending conflicts that were often proxies for superpower competition. With the end of this bipolar world system, the UN and other organizations have become involved in record numbers of peace operations. To resolve these crises, such operations require significant cooperation between various organizations that contribute military, humanitarian, political, economic, and other forms of expertise and resources. **The complexities of modern crisis events are such that no single organization, department, or agency has all the requisite resources, authority, or expertise to single-handedly provide an effective response.**

b. The National Security Strategy (NSS) of 2006 states that the United States is now threatened by failing states, state sponsors of terrorism, and the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. Regional conflicts, if left unaddressed, can lead to undesirable ends: failed states, humanitarian disasters, and ungoverned areas that can become safe havens for terrorists. The NSS further states that the United States will work to bolster threatened states, provide relief in times of crisis, and build capacity in developing states to increase their progress. This strategy requires the integration of all instruments of US national power - economic measures to terminate terrorist financing, diplomatic initiatives to mitigate terrorists' political support, informational activities to counter extremist ideologies, and military operations against identified threats.

c. The strategic and operational coordination between USG agencies is essential to improve planning and operations in complex environments. The requirement for enhanced interagency cooperation has been recognized at the three levels of war: strategic, operational, and tactical. **At the operational level, the need for greater interagency cooperation prompted the establishment of JIACGs at the combatant commands.**

## 3. Cooperation Considerations

a. Coordination and integration among the joint force and USG agencies cannot be described like the command and control (C2) relationships for a military operation. The C2 structure that supports a military operation is very different from that of civilian organizations. These differences present significant challenges to coordination efforts and ultimately to unified action. **USG agencies may have different organizational cultures and, in some cases, conflicting goals, policies, procedures, and decision-making techniques and processes.**

b. The military tends to rely on structured decision-making processes, detailed planning procedures, and C2 systems to plan and execute joint operations. Although USG agencies may employ similar principles, their systems may not be as structured as those employed by US military forces. Typically, USG agencies will coordinate among and between agencies and organizations if they share mutual interests, not because of some formalized C2 system. **Continuous and close interagency coordination and cooperation are necessary to overcome confusion over objectives, inadequate structure or procedures, bureaucratic processes, and personnel limitations.** Having members

from these agencies in the JIACG, who understand all the different complexities, can help expedite coordination and manage expectations.

c. Unlike the military, most USG agencies are not equipped and organized to create separate staffs at all levels of war. The military coordinates at the strategic-national level (Office of the Secretary of Defense [OSD] and the JS), strategic-theater level (combatant command), operational level (combatant command and joint task force [JTF]), and at the tactical level of war. Most USG agencies operate at the strategic-national level (Washington, DC offices) and in the field at the tactical level (country team). **For example, although some regional coordination and projects occur to some extent within the bureaus of DOS and USAID, detailed regional operational planning is less common.** Consequently, combatant command and JTF staffs may find themselves interacting with USG agency representatives who are coordinating their organizations' activities at multiple levels. The JIACG at the operational level can potentially mitigate the effects of this problem.

d. Several directives have significantly shaped interagency coordination:

(1) Presidential Decision Directive (PDD)-25, *United States: Administration Policy on Reforming Multilateral Peace Operations*, was developed as a peace operations policy framework for the post-Cold War period. Among other things, it addresses issues related to reform and improvement to include interagency policy, lines of authority, roles, and missions for DOD and DOS when coordinating peace operations.

(a) PDD-25 created a new "shared responsibility" approach to managing and funding UN peace operations within the USG. DOD will take lead management and funding responsibility for those UN operations that involve US combat units and those that are likely to involve combat, whether or not US troops are involved. This ensures that military expertise is brought to bear on those operations that may have a significant military component. DOS retains lead management and funding responsibility for traditional peacekeeping operations that do not involve US combat units. In all cases, DOS remains responsible for the conduct of diplomacy and instructions to US embassies and the UN mission in New York.

(b) PDD-25 elevated DOD to the lead agency for certain peace operations, thereby requiring DOD to lead the planning and management of operations that involve combat units and peace enforcement missions in coordination with USG agencies.

(2) National Security Presidential Directive (NSPD)-44, *Management of Interagency Efforts Concerning Reconstruction and Stabilization*, provided DOS with the responsibility to coordinate and lead USG efforts, involving all USG departments and agencies with relevant capabilities, to prepare, plan for, and conduct stabilization and reconstruction activities and ensure harmonization with any planned or ongoing US military operation.

(3) DOD Directive 3000.05, *Military Support for Stability, Security, Transition, and Reconstruction (SSTR) Operations*, describes the role of DOD as defined in NSPD-44. It states that integrated civilian and military efforts are key to successful stability operations and directs DOD to work closely with USG departments and agencies, foreign governments, global and regional organizations, IGOs, NGOs, and the private sector.

## 4. Building and Maintaining Coordination

a. The involvement of a large number of USG agencies with different and competing priorities and procedures is a significant challenge. There is no perfect solution; however, there are some discrete steps that may be followed by commanders and staffs at all levels that provide an orderly and systematic approach for building and maintaining coordination:

### BUILDING AND MAINTAINING COORDINATION

- Forge a collective definition of the problem in clear and unambiguous terms
- Understand the objectives, end state, and transition criteria for each involved organization or agency
- Understand the differences between US national objectives, end state, and transition criteria
- Establish a common frame of reference
- Develop courses of action or options
- Capitalize on experience
- Establish responsibility
- Plan for the transition of key responsibilities, capabilities, and functions
- Direct all means toward unity of effort

**SOURCE: JP 3-08, *Interagency, Intergovernmental Organization, and Nongovernmental Organization Coordination During Joint Operations Vol I***

(1) **Forge a Collective Definition of the Problem in Clear and Unambiguous Terms.** The differences in assumptions and perspectives can cloud the understanding of the problem. Representatives from engaged USG agencies should be involved early in the planning process. Consider the establishment and deployment of an interagency assessment team.

(2) **Understand the Objectives, End State, and Transition Criteria for Each Involved Organization or Agency.** Commanders and other decisionmakers should establish well defined objectives and transition criteria to support the military end state dictated by national strategic objectives. This may be problematic since the proposed end state, and the resulting objectives, is dependent on the perspective of the interagency participant. Some USG agencies may not understand or agree with the objectives and may not respond with the same sense of urgency or specificity of military planners.

(3) **Understand the Differences Between US National Objectives, End State, and Transition Criteria.** Although USG agencies may participate in defining the problem, their goals and objectives may be independent of those developed by the JFC and staff.

(4) **Establish a Common Frame of Reference.** Differences in terminology and language complicate coordination. The meaning of some terms may be completely different and misunderstanding them may result in serious consequences. Military and civilian differences in terminology are magnified in an interagency environment. Commanders, staffs, and interagency members must anticipate confusion and take measures to clarify and establish common terms with clear and specific usage. **Promote the use of a common English dictionary and supplement it with JP 1-02, Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms, which may offer a starting point to help develop a common planning language.**

(5) **Develop Courses of Action or Options.** Courses of action (COAs) should address the mission and achieve objectives. Commanders and staffs should focus on military enabling capabilities that contribute to attaining national strategic objectives and are part of the interagency plan of action. COA security and classification issues require flexible and viable options to lead to good solutions. Providing too few or clearly impractical options or recommending the “middle of the road” approach merely for the sake of achieving consensus is of little service to decisionmakers. Open debate within the interagency community facilitates the formulation of viable options. Cooperation and synchronization are achieved when interagency coordination allows consideration of all positions. **Commanders and staffs will be but one among many at the interagency table.**

(6) **Capitalize on Experience.** Review after-action reports and lessons learned using the joint and Services lessons learned systems, the Office of the Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization (S/CRS) Essential Task Matrix, and the US Army Peacekeeping and Stability Operations Institute products to assess proposed COAs. Non-DOD agencies may have their own less formal systems in place, which should be reviewed whenever possible.

*See US Joint Forces Command (USJFCOM) J-7 Pamphlet Version 1.0, US Government Draft Planning for Reconstruction, Stabilization, and Conflict Transformation, for a discussion of the interagency planning process for reconstruction and stabilization and the Essential Task Matrix.*

(7) **Establish Responsibility.** A common sense of ownership and commitment toward resolution is achievable when all participants understand what needs to be done and agree upon the means to accomplish it. The resources required for a mission must be identified, with specific and agreed upon responsibility assigned to the agencies that will provide them. To receive proper reimbursement from USG agencies for materiel support, careful responsibility and accounting procedures must be established.

(8) **Plan for the Transition of Key Responsibilities, Capabilities, and Functions.** In most multiagency operations, civilian organizations will remain engaged after the military has accomplished its assigned tasks and departed the operational area. **Plan the transfer to civil authority for specific actions or tasks prior to employing military forces.** This process must begin at the national level. When interagency planning for a transfer of authority does not occur, military involvement may be needlessly protracted. As campaign plans, operation plans (OPLANs), and operation orders

(OPORDs) are developed, planning for a transition of authority should be a primary consideration. Commanders and staffs should anticipate the impact of transferring authority on the local populace and others.

*For further guidance on transfer to civil authority, refer to JP 3-0, Joint Operations.*

(9) **Direct All Means Toward Unity of Effort.** Unified actions direct all means to a common purpose. DOD will often not be responsible for determining the mission or specifying the participating agencies when in a supporting role. Appropriate organization, C2, and, most importantly, an understanding of the objectives of the organizations involved are all unified actions to build consensus and unity of effort, regardless of role. A critical enabler in ensuring unity of effort is the reciprocal exchange of information. **If information flow is not two-way, with mutual benefits, JIACG efforts will be mitigated or not supported by some agencies.**

*For further guidance on building and maintaining coordination, refer to JP 3-08, Interagency, Intergovernmental Organization, and Nongovernmental Organization Coordination During Joint Operations, Vol I.*

b. In addition to the steps in subparagraph 4a, the following techniques may be employed by CCDRs and staffs to support effective interagency coordination:

- (1) Identify USG agencies that are or should be involved in the joint operation.
- (2) Identify potential obstacles to the interagency effort, derived from conflicting priorities, and determine and coordinate the means for mitigation.
- (3) Deconflict the resources provided by each USG agency to reduce or mitigate duplication of effort and foster cohesion.
- (4) Maximize use of mission assets to support the longer-term goals of the enterprise.
- (5) Establish and exercise interagency forums, assessment teams, and working groups prior to crisis events.

## 5. Strategic Communication

a. CCDRs support USG policies and decisions through their actions and communication activities. Planning and coordination of these actions and communication activities is performed through a strategic communication process directed by the commander and informed by input from the chain of command and other non-military organizations and partners. The intent is to inform and influence intended foreign audiences about a wide array of joint operations, including transition to and from hostilities, security operations, military forward presence, and stability operations. These communication actions are primarily accomplished through public affairs (PA), information operations (IO) capabilities, civil-military operations (CMO), and military-to-military activities. The synchronization of PA, IO, CMO, and military-to-military activities is essential for effective strategic communication.

**KEY TERM**

**Strategic Communication.** Focused United States Government efforts to understand and engage key audiences to create, strengthen or preserve conditions favorable for the advancement of United States Government interests, policies, and objectives through the use of coordinated programs, plans, themes, messages, and products synchronized with the actions of all instruments of national power.

**SOURCE:** JP 1-02, *Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms*

b. At the operational level, CCDRs, staffs, and JIACGs should consider the impact that PA, IO, CMO, and military-to-military actions have on the joint operation and on the interagency process. One or more of these elements may also participate in defense support to public diplomacy initiatives that directly support DOS public diplomacy goals. While CCDRs directly control assigned PA and IO assets, they do not direct those assets engaged in public diplomacy, which are the responsibility of DOS or the local US embassy. This highlights the difference between the CCDR's communication strategy and the interagency nature of strategic communication.

c. **The JIACG can assist in the CCDR's effort to ensure planning for IO, PA, CMO, and military-to-military actions are consistent with overall USG strategic communication objectives.** CCDRs should consider including their JIACGs in the communication process to support communication planning and actions that are directly related to the CCDR's communication strategy while supporting the intended effects in all situations. Each of the communication activities under the direction of the CCDRs have the ability to influence and inform key foreign audiences through words and actions to foster understanding of US policy and advance US interests. Collaboratively, they can help shape the operational environment. CCDRs plan, execute, and assess these activities to implement security cooperation plans in support of US embassies' information programs, public diplomacy, and PA programs directly supporting DOD missions.

**KEY TERMS**

**Civil-Military Operations.** The activities of a commander that establish, maintain, influence, or exploit relations between military forces, governmental and nongovernmental civilian organizations and authorities, and the civilian populace in a friendly, neutral, or hostile operational area in order to facilitate military operations, to consolidate and achieve operational US objectives. Civil-military operations may include performance by military forces of activities and functions normally the responsibility of the local, regional, or national government. These activities may occur prior to, during, or subsequent to other military actions. They may also occur, if directed, in the absence of other military operations. Civil-military operations may be performed by designated civil affairs, by other military forces, or by a combination of civil affairs and other forces.

**KEY TERMS (Cont.)**

**Defense Support to Public Diplomacy.** Those activities and measures taken by the Department of Defense components to support and facilitate public diplomacy efforts of the United States Government.

**Information Operations.** The integrated employment of the core capabilities of electronic warfare, computer network operations, psychological operations, military deception, and operations security, in concert with specified supporting and related capabilities, to influence, disrupt, corrupt or usurp adversarial human and automated decision making while protecting our own.

**Public Affairs.** Those public information, command information, and community relations activities directed toward both the external and internal publics with interest in the Department of Defense.

**SOURCE: JP 1-02, Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and  
Associated Terms**

# CHAPTER III

## ORGANIZING FOR SUCCESSFUL

### INTERAGENCY COORDINATION: JOINT INTERAGENCY COORDINATION GROUP

*“Close cooperation with our interagency and international partners is an important element of success . . . Our Joint Interagency Coordination Group within the headquarters is an example of this new wave of integration.”*

**General John Abizaid, Commander, US Central Command,  
Senate Armed Services Committee, Annual Posture Statement,  
March 3, 2004**

## 1. Introduction

a. **Purpose.** The JIACG is an interagency staff group that establishes regular, timely, and collaborative working relationships between USG civilian and military operational planners. The JIACG participates in security cooperation, contingency, crisis, and transition planning. Representing USG agencies at the combatant command headquarters, the JIACG is a multi-functional, advisory element that facilitates information sharing across the interagency community. Accredited to the CCDR and tailored to meet the requirements of a supported CCDR, the JIACG provides the capability to collaborate at the strategic and operational level with USG civilian agencies and departments. JIACGs complement the interagency coordination that takes place at the strategic level through the National Security Council System (NSCS). JIACG members provide links back to their parent civilian agencies to help synchronize joint force operations with the efforts of USG agencies and departments.

### b. Concept

(1) Establishing and maintaining habitual lines of communications between the combatant commands and the Washington, DC, interagency community was recognized as a problem that could be solved with minimal resource demands and a relatively simple organizational construct. **The JIACG, with its tools, processes, and procedures, is viewed as an important step in overall DOD efforts to strengthen the capability to coordinate joint operations.** In coordination with the JS J-5, the prototype JIACG was viewed as a means to explore the results of experimentation and address the concerns of the CCDRs.

(2) The war on terrorism and the conflicts in Afghanistan and Iraq greatly expanded the need for closely aligning military operations with US diplomatic, law enforcement, financial control, and intelligence activities. Following the events of September 11, 2001, the JS was granted approval by the Deputies Committee of the National Security Council (NSC/DC) to establish a limited JIACG capability in each combatant command to enhance interagency coordination at the operational level. With staff members from the DOS, Department of Justice (DOJ), and Department of the Treasury (TREAS), this limited JIACG capability has shown increasing value in prosecuting the

war on terrorism and offered numerous other benefits to participating military activities and civilian agencies.

(3) The JIACG has moved beyond the strictly counterterrorism arena and is emerging as collaboratively-enabled, multi-disciplined teams that support military engagement, security cooperation, and deterrence activities, as well as operations ranging from crisis response and limited contingency operations to, if necessary, major operations and campaigns. The JIACG described in this handbook is an advisory element on the CCDR's staff that facilitates information sharing and coordinated action across the interagency community. **Per the initial direction of the NSC/DC and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the JIACG does not make policy or task interagency elements; nor is it designed to alter existing lines of authority or reporting.** However, when properly staffed and collaboratively-enabled, it provides a powerful tool to improve awareness and better integrate operational planning and coordination between the CCDR and the larger interagency community.

*For further guidance on the JIACG concept, refer to USJFCOM Concept of Operations, Prototype Concept of Operations for Full-Spectrum Joint Interagency Coordination Group (JIACG).*

c. **Mission.** The JIACG effort is focused on acquiring, vetting, and managing the flow of information to enhance joint operation planning by offering a broader decision-making context that includes civilian USG agencies both in Washington, DC and in the AOR. The JIACG should interact with the command group and the combatant command staff directorates on a daily basis to stay abreast of changing issues. It draws on the command's planning and operations expertise within the headquarters to ensure relevant and timely connections are made with USG agencies and activities. It leverages the experience, expertise, and core competencies of members by having selective USG agency representatives permanently assigned to the JIACG. The result is a fusing of USG agency operational intentions and capabilities with military planning and operations to achieve a harmonization of effort.

## 2. Organization

a. **Roles and Responsibilities.** DOD components, whether leading or supporting integrated operations and activities, shall work through OSD in accordance with existing policy and doctrine to communicate, coordinate, cooperate, collaborate, and synchronize, to the maximum extent practicable, with other members of the USG interagency community. **The JIACG provides the CCDR with the primary and readily available integration venue for coordinating interagency efforts with joint force actions at theater strategic and operational levels.** Their role is to enhance the interchange among USG agencies and military organizations and provide the CCDR with a capability specifically organized to enhance situational awareness of USG agency activities and keep agencies and military organizations informed of each other's efforts to prevent undesired consequences and uncoordinated USG activity. Accordingly, the JIACG:

(1) Participates in combatant command security cooperation, joint operation planning, and assessment.

(2) Advises the CCDR on USG policies, positions, and strategic planning efforts, as appropriate. JIACG members provide information to combatant command planners on their parent agencies' current policies, positions on developing policies, and potential resources and assets that may be useful.

(3) Provides interagency planning perspective during joint operations.

(4) Informs the combatant command of interagency approaches, support requirements, capabilities and limitations.

(5) Establishes habitual relationships and collaborative links to planners within USG agencies.

(6) Arranges interfaces for planning and rehearsal exercises and other joint operation planning activities.

(7) Facilitates communications with JTF staff and component planners regarding interagency issues.

(8) Supports the deployment and employment of S/CRS teams within the AOR.

## b. Relationships

### (1) Joint Forces and the Interagency

(a) The relationship between joint forces and USG agencies should not be equated to command relationships. During combat operations such as Operation DESERT STORM or in foreign humanitarian assistance operations such as Operation PROVIDE COMFORT, DOD was the lead agency and was supported by other USG agencies. When DOD is tasked to provide combat support, its forces perform in a supporting role. In an interagency situation, DOD may support or be supported by other USG agencies in a non-command relationship. **Whether supported or supporting, close coordination between the military and non-DOD USG agencies is essential and can be facilitated by a JIACG.**

(b) The relationship between joint forces and NGOs is unclear because NGOs do not operate within military, governmental, or IGO chains of command. If formed, the joint force's civil-military operations center is the focal point where US forces coordinate with NGOs. As private organizations, NGOs are unlikely to play a supporting role to the military. However, they may accept funding from IGOs or USG agencies like USAID and assume a role as "implementing partners." This relationship is not as strong as command authority; however, it does give the granting agency oversight authority over how the funds are spent.

*For additional information on the civil-military operations center, refer to JP 3-57, Joint Doctrine for Civil-Military Operations.*

### (2) Combatant Command Staff and the JIACG

(a) Within the staff, the JIACG can provide the greatest value-added when authorized to operate across a CCDR's staff and components. Lessons learned and experimentation have shown the greatest efficacy of the JIACG as a separate staff element reporting directly to the deputy commander or the chief of staff.

(b) The JIACG should be task-organized to support the entire combatant command staff and should be prepared to contribute staff members to participate in appropriate boards, centers, bureaus, cells and working groups established and operating within the command's battle rhythm. **The closest possible working relationship between the JIACG and staff directorates must be established and nurtured.** The JIACG should have functional relationships with multiple staff elements, to include:

1. **J-3, Operations Directorate.** JIACG planners should be fully engaged with joint operation planners to ensure, among other issues, that operational-level plans under development are synchronized and fully supportive of broader interagency goals. JIACG planners can assist in harmonizing military plans with US embassy mission performance plans and USAID strategic plans guidance.

2. **J-5, Plans Directorate.** Habitual interaction with home departments and agencies will enable JIACG planners to facilitate the development of combatant command strategic plans and policies and enhance the timeliness of ongoing political-military (POLMIL) planning. **Commands employing a systems perspective of the operational environment to support joint operation planning and joint intelligence preparation of the operational environment should coordinate with JIACG planners for confirmation of underlying assumptions and analyses.** A systems perspective can support the concept of achieving unity of effort in any operation by providing a common frame of reference for planning with USG agencies that represent other instruments of national power. This systems view can facilitate the combatant command staff collaboration with counterparts from USG agencies to determine and coordinate necessary actions that are beyond the CCDR's command authority.

3. **Foreign Policy Advisor/Political Advisor (FPA/POLAD).** The unique and highly individualized relationship between the CCDR and the FPA/POLAD can be enhanced by the JIACG's habitual interaction with Washington, DC based agencies and field offices in the AOR. JIACG support to this relationship should remain highly flexible and responsive to individual requirements. Ultimately, the organizational relationship of the JIACG with the FPA/POLAD is subject to the discretion of the CCDR.

#### FOREIGN POLICY ADVISOR/POLITICAL-ADVISOR AND THE JOINT INTERAGENCY COORDINATION GROUP

**The foreign policy advisor/political-advisor (FPA/POLAD) engaged the "full-spectrum" Joint Interagency Coordination Group (JIACG) continually throughout the exercise, facilitating the exchange of information and expert opinion on strategic and operational matters of concern to the combatant command. The productive and collaborative relationship the JIACG established with the FPA/POLAD was extraordinary - a clear demonstration that a JIACG could work**

constructively and effectively with the FPA/POLAD. Two specific examples where the FPA/POLAD and the JIACG can work together are:

- Development of the mission statement for the combatant command; and
- Development of a political-military plan for the combatant command that maps US strategic goals and objectives as well as provides guidance to civilian agencies for their planning of program activities.

SOURCE: US Southern Command Exercise BLUE ADVANCE '04

4. **Standing Joint Force Headquarters (Core Element) (SJFHQ [CE]).** The SJFHQ [CE] is a staff organization that provides CCDRs with a full-time, trained joint C2 element, fully integrated into the CCDR's planning and operations. The SJFHQ (CE) is staffed to provide a core element of trained personnel that may serve as both a nucleus of key functional and C2 expertise and a foundation on which to build, through augmentation, the joint C2 capability for specific mission areas. Its principal roles are to enhance the command's daily planning efforts, improve operational area awareness for specific focus areas, accelerate the formation of a JTF headquarters, and facilitate crisis response by the joint force. It helps the CCDR determine where to focus joint capabilities to prevent or resolve a crisis. **The JIACG provides a conduit for interagency inputs to the SJFHQ (CE), assists in identifying and facilitating access to non-DOD centers of excellence for SJFHQ (CE) analysts, and contributes to joint operation planning.** The POLMIL planner on the SJFHQ (CE) staff is the primary linkage between the SJFHQ (CE) and the JIACG.

*For further guidance on the SJFHQ (CE), refer to JP 3-0, Joint Operations.*

### 3. Structure and Focus

a. **Design.** When security cooperation, contingency, or crisis action planning is required, the degree to which military and USG agencies are integrated and harmonized will bear directly on efficiency and success. Joint operation planning should include key participants from the outset. The CCDR, through the strategic concept, builds interagency activities into Annex V, *Interagency Coordination*, of the OPLAN. Annex V is required for all Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff-approved contingency plans and provides a single source reference for the CCDR to request interagency activities and to lay the groundwork for interagency coordination. Subordinate JFCs and components should also build interagency participation into their operations. Within the AOR, appropriate decision-making structures are established at combatant command and JTF headquarters and tactical levels to coordinate and resolve military, political, humanitarian, and other issues. The JIACG provides the CCDR the means for organizing for successful interagency coordination focused at the operational level and below.

(1) The JIACG is fully integrated into the combatant command staff and is a primary participant in the planning process. It provides the CCDR with a standing capability to enhance situational awareness of USG agency activities and to keep all engaged USG

agencies informed of each others efforts to prevent the undesired consequences of uncoordinated activity.

(2) A full-time, fully-resourced operational JIACG broadens the CCDR's understanding of the operational environment and the range and availability of response options. If the decision is made to employ joint forces, the CCDR may retain the JIACG in-place at the combatant command headquarters and integrate selected members of the JIACG into the JTF.

**b. Collaboration**

(1) Effective C2 requires that commanders, their staffs, and the JIACG collaborate in developing, understanding, and communicating the CCDR's intent and determining the mission, operational objectives, desired effects, and tasks. In addition, the CCDR and staff must synchronize execution across all domains and the information environment by coordinating with USG agencies, NGOs, IGOs, and multinational partners and continually assess the operational environment. **Capabilities that improve long-distance collaboration among dispersed agencies and organizations can enhance both planning and execution of joint operations.** Information management can be more effective within a collaborative environment that integrates JIACG participation with the combatant command staff.

**KEY TERMS**

**Collaborative Environment.** One in which participants share data, information, knowledge, perceptions, ideas, and concepts, often in real time regardless of physical location.

**Information Management.** The function of managing an organization's information resources by the handling of knowledge acquired by one or many different individuals and organizations in a way that optimizes access by all who have a share in that knowledge or a right to that knowledge.

**SOURCE: JP 3-0, Joint Operations**

(2) Collaboration enables military and JIACG planners to build interagency plans in discrete parts concurrently rather than sequentially, and integrate the results into OPLANs. Collaboration also provides planners with a view of the whole planning process as they work on various sections of the OPLAN, which helps them identify and resolve planning shortfalls and conflicts early.

(3) The JIACG develops and maintains relationships through collaboration with key USG agencies and departments that can provide specific expertise. **The effective integration of the JIACG into the collaborative environment will result in an improved understanding of the CCDR's intent, objectives, effects, and required tasks, and, if properly managed, contribute to more effective interagency coordination and planning and increased execution efficiency.**

*For further guidance on collaboration in joint operations and joint operation planning, refer to JP 3-0, Joint Operations, and JP 5-0, Joint Operation Planning.*

c. **JIACG Focus.** The JIACG can aid military planners at all levels by focusing on the following:

(1) Identify interagency partners that are or should be involved in the operation. In most cases, initial planning and coordination with USG agencies will have occurred in the National Security Council (NSC), DOD, the JS, and Services.

(2) Understand and clarify, if required, the interagency hierarchy. **Draft an authoritative interagency hierarchy diagram, including the lead USG agency having primary responsibility, so that relational lines and decision pathways can be easily identified.**

(3) Clarify the objectives of the response that should be outlined in the statement of conclusions from the relevant NSC, National Security Council/Principals Committee (NSC/PC), or NSC/DC meetings that authorized the overall USG participation.

(4) Review COAs for the assigned military tasks and determine the operational compatibility with USG agencies.

(5) Cooperate with each interagency participant and obtain a clear definition of the role that each plays. In some situations, they may not have representatives either in theater or be collocated with the combatant command's staff. The JIACG can advise and recommend that the CDR request temporary assignment of liaison officers from the participating agencies and departments.

(6) Identify potential obstacles arising from conflicting priorities. Early identification of potential obstacles and concurrence to solutions by all participants is the first step toward resolution. Often these obstacles are assumed to have been addressed by another agency or department. If the obstacles cannot be resolved by the JIACG, they may be forwarded up to the appropriate level for resolution.

(7) Identify resources relevant to the situation. Determine which interagency participants are committed to provide these resources to reduce duplication, increase coherence in the collective effort, and identify what additional resources are needed.

(8) Assist military planners in defining the appropriate military end state, plan for the transfer to civil authority, and recommend redeployment considerations.

(9) Recommend the ways and means to optimize the varied and extensive resources available to complement and support the broader, long-term objectives during and after the response to a crisis.

(10) Coordinate the establishment of interagency assessment teams that can rapidly deploy to the area to evaluate the situation.

(11) Participate and contribute to CAP for incidents or situations involving a threat to the United States, its territories, citizens, military forces, and possessions or vital interests that may require interagency coordination to achieve US objectives.

d. **Notional JIACG.** To effectively bring all instruments of national power to bear on theater and regional strategies as well as campaign and OPLANs, CCDRs are augmented with representatives from USG agencies that may be assigned to the combatant command's JIACG

(1) Each combatant command has tasks and, as such, each JIACG is structured with the requisite capabilities to support them. Figure III-1 offers a baseline organization structure for a JIACG at the combatant command. **This structure can be augmented as the combatant command transitions from planning to execution and to an even more robust capability when engaged in stability operations.** However, regardless of structure, the JIACG must provide regular, timely, and collaborative day-to-day support for planning, coordination, preparation, and implementation of interagency activities. Specific objectives of this organizational structure are to:

- (a) Improve combatant command interagency joint operation planning and execution.
- (b) Exercise secure collaboration processes and procedures.
- (c) Promote habitual relationships among the combatant command and interagency partners.

(2) USG agencies may assign liaison personnel to combatant command staffs to improve interagency coordination. For example, liaison officers may be assigned to combatant command staffs to facilitate intelligence and antiterrorism support. These liaison personnel should be used to augment the core JIACG staff.

e. **Manning.** The JIACG is viewed as a relatively small, full-time core element consisting primarily of civilian personnel with extensive interagency coordination experience. The JIACG is led by a full-time civilian director. **The core element is responsible for providing guidance, facilitation, coordination, and synchronization of interagency activities within the AOR.** It is envisioned as a staff directorate of approximately 12 personnel within the headquarters of the combatant command with the capability to be augmented with virtual or additional collocated members, as required.

*For further guidance on key JIACG billet and their descriptions, refer to Appendix C, "Joint Interagency Coordination Group Position Descriptions and Qualifications."*




Figure III-1. Notional Joint Interagency Coordination Group Structure

#### 4. Key Interagency Participants at the Combatant Command

In addition to the JIACG, it is important to understand the roles and functions of other selective interagency participants in the AOR.

a. **The US Mission.** The United States has bilateral diplomatic relations with approximately 180 of the world's countries. The US bilateral representation in a foreign

country, known as the diplomatic mission, is established in accordance with the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations, of which the United States is a signatory. DOS provides the core staff of a mission and administers the presence of representatives of other USG agencies in the country. **It is imperative that JIACG members identify their counterparts within the mission and establish the procedures necessary to conduct efficient and effective coordination.** The mission is led by a chief of mission (COM), usually the ambassador, but at times the chargé des affaires, ad interim (the chargé), when no US ambassador is accredited to the country or the ambassador is absent from the country. The deputy chief of mission (DCM) is second in charge of the mission and usually assumes the role of chargé in the absence of the COM. For countries with which the United States has no diplomatic relations, the embassy of a friendly country often accepts the duty of watching out for US affairs in the country and at times houses an interests section staffed with USG employees.

### JOINT INTERAGENCY COORDINATION GROUP AND THE US MISSION

**As US European Command (USEUCOM) prepared to support the US Mission to Greece and American participation in the 2004 Summer Olympics held in Athens, it conducted a series of exercises designed to further the coordination and planning effort. The Joint Interagency Coordination Group (JIACG) played a central role within the USEUCOM Plans and Operations Center (EPOC) in facilitating the coordination between the US Mission, US military, and US civilian agencies (Department of State, Bureau for Counterterrorism; Federal Bureau of Investigation; Department of the Treasury, etc.). Representatives of these agencies were part of the JIACG. Recognizing the political nature of the Olympics, the potential threat, and the concept that the US ambassador was “drawing” interagency expertise and resources for the security effort, the JIACG played an instrumental role in coordinating USEUCOM support to the civilian agencies, to the staff and commander, to the military units participating in the exercise and the mission, and to the US Mission.**

**SOURCE: US European Command  
Exercise AGILE RESPONSE/SILENT GUIDE '04**

(1) **US Ambassador/Chief of Mission.** The ambassador/COM is the personal representative of the President to the government of the foreign country to which accredited and, as such, is the COM, responsible for recommending and implementing national policy regarding the foreign country and for overseeing the activities of USG employees in the mission. The President, with the advice and consent of the Senate, appoints the ambassador. The ambassador has extraordinary decision-making authority as the senior USG official “on the ground” during crises.

(2) **Country Team.** The country team, headed by the ambassador/COM, is the senior in-country interagency coordinating body. **The composition of a country team varies, depending on the desires of the ambassador/COM, the in-country situation, and the numbers and levels of USG agencies and departments present.** Typically, it is composed of the ambassador/COM, DCM, the senior member of each USG department or agency in-country, and other USG personnel as determined by the ambassador/COM.

Each member presents the position of their parent organization to the country team and conveys country team considerations back to their parent organization. The ambassador/COM confers with the country team to develop foreign policy toward the HN and to disseminate decisions to the members of the mission. The country team concept (see Figure III-2 for a typical country team) provides the foundation for rapid interagency consultation and action on recommendations from the field and effective execution of US programs and policies. Agencies are required to coordinate their plans, operations, and activities and keep one another and the ambassador informed. Country team members who represent USG agencies other than DOS are routinely in contact with their parent agencies. **Issues arising within the country team can become interagency issues at the national level if they are not resolved locally or when they have broader national implications.**




Figure III-2. The Country Team Concept

(3) **US Defense Attaché Office.** The US Defense Attaché Office (USDAO) is an office of Service attachés managed by the Defense Intelligence Agency. A US defense attaché (DATT) heads the USDAO in country and is a member of the country team. The DATT is normally the senior Service attaché assigned to the mission. The attaches serve as liaisons with their HN counterparts and are valuable sources of information for the ambassador/COM and CCDR on the military affairs of the HN. The DATT may be accredited to more than one country. The Service attachés report to the ambassador/COM but coordinate with and represent their respective Military Departments on Service matters. The attachés assist in the foreign internal defense program by exchanging information with the CCDR's staff on HN military, political, humanitarian, religious, social, and economic conditions and interagency coordination.

(4) **Security Assistance Office/Officer/Organization.** The security assistance office/officer/organization (SAO) focuses efforts on the equipment and procurement programs of the HN. The SAO may be called the military group, office of defense cooperation, military liaison office, or military assistance advisory group, among other names, depending on the country. They normally are not accredited diplomats unless they have a dual role as assistant attaches. The office administers the foreign military sales and international military education and training programs and other training programs and coordinates CCDR-developed multinational exercises and other initiatives. Some billets in the SAO are funded by the Defense Security Assistance Agency, because they deal mostly with foreign military sales programs, and others may be funded with the combatant command operation and maintenance funds.

b. **Foreign Policy Advisor/Political Advisor.** CCDRs and, increasingly, subordinate JFCs are assigned a FPA/POLAD by DOS. The FPA/POLAD provides USG foreign policy perspectives and diplomatic considerations and establishes linkages with US embassies in the AOR and with DOS. The FPA/POLAD provides information regarding DOS objectives that are relevant to the geographic CCDR's strategy or subordinate JFC's plans. The FPA/POLAD is directly responsible to the CCDR or subordinate JFC and can be of assistance in interagency coordination.

c. **Interagency Executive Steering Council**

(1) JIACG and interagency integration is emphasized within the combatant command staff by the establishment of an Interagency Executive Steering Council (IA ESC). The IA ESC is usually co-chaired by the deputy commander and the FPA/POLAD and attended by the chief of staff, JIACG director, special staff and JTF or components, as required. In addition, there may be US embassy country team representatives, as required, and multinational representatives when appropriate. **The JIACG director may serve in a dual capacity as both a member and executive secretary of the IA ESC.**

(2) The IA ESC provides JIACG oversight and will meet periodically to review interagency posture, operations and plans, and offers a forum to identify, discuss, and determine the way ahead and an office of primary responsibility. **IA ESC provides face-to-face interaction between senior interagency operational leaders that can overcome some bureaucratic obstacles to cooperation and further develop a reservoir of understanding before a crisis develops.** Figure III-3 provides a view of a notional IA ESC with recommended membership and functions.

d. **Department of State, Office of the Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization**

(1) In 2004, Congress authorized the reprogramming of funds to establish S/CRS. Its mission is to lead, coordinate, and institutionalize USG civilian capacity to prevent or prepare for post-conflict situations, and to help stabilize and reconstruct



**Figure III-3. Interagency Executive Steering Council**

societies in transition from conflict or civil strife so they can reach a sustainable path toward peace, democracy, and a market economy.

(2) S/CRS will coordinate and integrate USG civilian stabilization and reconstruction activities undertaken by other USG offices, agencies, and departments to ensure unified action, provide implementers with more effective and rapid response capabilities, identify gaps, and remove barriers. **The JIACG must be prepared to facilitate and support the link between the combatant command staff and S/CRS teams and other civilian contingency teams.** S/CRS teams may include:

(a) **Country Reconstruction and Stabilization Group (CSRG).** The CSRG, as established by the NSC, is a policy-level group that serves as the main interagency coordination body in a contingency operation.

(b) **Integration Planning Cell (IPC).** The IPC serves as an operational-level civilian planning and advising body at the combatant command and will augment and enhance the JIACG's support capabilities.

(c) **Advance Civilian Team (ACT).** The ACT is a fly-away team providing an immediate civilian presence in the field, working directly with the JFC or US ambassador, depending on the requirement.

### CIVIL-MILITARY PLANNING TEAM AND THE JOINT INTERAGENCY COORDINATION GROUP

In exercise FUERTAS DEFENSAS (FD) '05, the small Joint Interagency Coordination Group (JIACG) in US Southern Command served several useful functions with respect to the exercise and the command. In this exercise, evaluation and assessment of the new Office of the Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization's Humanitarian, Reconstruction, and Stabilization Team (HRST) was an important objective. The HRST (later called the Civil-Military Planning Team (CMPT) and now the Integration Planning Cell [IPC]), is a small civilian team deployed to the combatant command to participate in the detailed operational planning and coordination of specific operations/missions. In FD 05, the JIACG and the HRST quickly developed a working relationship that benefited both elements. With its institutional knowledge, the JIACG quickly brought the HRST "up-to-speed" on command staff and planning procedures and timelines. This enabled the HRST to meet with the right members of the staff at the appropriate times, to set priorities for engagement, and to produce timely input for staff and decision-making processes. The HRST, more robust than the JIACG at the time, was able to alleviate the JIACG of much of the focused, crisis-oriented planning by bringing additional country specific expertise to the operation. In addition, it freed the JIACG to continue its role in serving the commander and the staff by coordinating the continuing region-wide responsibilities and operations, for which a team sent from Washington, DC, with a specific mission, would have been overwhelmed. This interaction, which determined comparative advantage, divided the labor and achieved "economy of force," was one of the high points of the exercise.

**SOURCE: US Southern Command Exercise FUERTAS DEFENSAS '05**

e. **Joint Force Coordination Authority for Stability Operations.** In accordance with DOD Directive 3000.05, *Military Support for Stability, Security, Transition, and Reconstruction (SSTR) Operations*, the commanders of the geographic combatant commands, through the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, shall designate an appropriate military officer as the "joint force coordinating authority for stability operations" to ensure proper emphasis is given to preparing for stability operations.

f. **US Agency for International Development/Office of Foreign Disaster Assistance**

(1) USAID plays both a major role in US foreign policy and a principal role in interagency coordination. It is an autonomous agency under the policy direction of the Secretary of State and is led by the Administrator of USAID. USAID administers and directs the US foreign economic assistance program and is the lead agency for US foreign disaster assistance. USAID manages a worldwide network of country programs for economic and policy reforms that generate sound economic growth, encourage political freedom and good governance, and invest in human resource development.

(2) USAID is also the principal agency charged with coordinating the USG response to declared disasters and emergencies worldwide. Through its Office of Foreign Disaster Assistance, USAID administers the President's authority to provide emergency

relief and long-term humanitarian assistance in response to disasters as declared by the ambassador/COM within the affected country or higher DOS authority.

## 5. Other Interagency Partners

The JIACG will interact with interagency partners at the operational level. For an organizational listing, to include authorities and responsibilities, organizational structures, capabilities, core competencies, and relationship with or potential relationship with the Armed Forces of the United States, refer to JP 3-08, *Interagency, Intergovernmental Organization, and Nongovernmental Organization Coordination During Joint Operations, Volume II*.

## 6. Joint Interagency Coordination Group Policy Proposal

USJFCOM has proposed policy that assigns JIACG responsibilities and provides guidance for planning, training, exercising, and operating JIACGs within combatant commands. The following are recommended JIACG-related responsibilities:

### a. Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff

(1) Develop and publish joint doctrine in consultation with other members of the interagency community, as appropriate, on the roles and missions of the JIACG, to include interagency processes, operations, and activities.

(2) Include the JIACG in all relevant training, education, and exercise activities in coordination with the combatant commands, the Secretaries of the Military Departments, and other members of the interagency community.

(3) Develop, in coordination with the Secretaries of the Military Departments, curricula at joint military education and individual training venues for JIACG roles and responsibilities in supporting integrated operations and activities.

(4) Represent the combatant commands in discussions with the interagency community on issues germane to establishing and supporting the JIACG.

(5) Support the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy in developing and coordinating a plan to implement JIACG integration into interagency processes, including planning.

(6) Engage with the interagency community in support of the CCDRs to enable information sharing, operational planning, coordination, and execution.

### b. Combatant Commanders

(1) Establish a JIACG as a permanent part of the command staff, including specification of roles, missions, and promulgation of appropriate guidance or regulations for the AOR.

(2) Provide commander's intent and oversight for JIACG operations. Develop and refine the following for the JIACG:

- (a) Quality assurance/quality control procedures;
- (b) Standard operating procedures;
- (c) Evaluation parameters and metrics;
- (d) Feedback systems;
- (e) Selection process and qualifications for members;
- (f) Continuing education requirements for members; and
- (g) Individual and collective training requirements.

(3) Engage relevant members of the interagency community, in coordination with the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy, in support of JIACG sustainment.

(4) Include the JIACG in the command's joint training plan.

(5) Include the JIACG in existing command readiness evaluations, drawing as needed from the checklist in Appendix A, "Joint Interagency Coordination Group Planning Checklist."

**c. Commander, USJFCOM**

(1) Continue to explore and experiment with the JIACG concept drawing on lessons learned and the implementation of tasks in the Quadrennial Defense Review, Building Partnership Capacity Execution Roadmap.

(2) Continue to explore additional means to integrate the interagency community through joint experimentation, lessons learned, and refinement of collaboration techniques.

(3) Establish, design, and conduct training, experiments, and exercises for innovative integrated operations to include modeling and simulation and distributed operations, in coordination with the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and in conjunction with other combatant commands, other members of the interagency community, and other partners.

**d. Secretaries of the Military Departments**

(1) Support interagency requests, in accordance with existing DOD policy and guidance, for personnel or assistance to bolster the capabilities of the interagency community to prepare for and plan integrated operations.

(2) Program resources in support of staffing requirements for JIACG military and DOD civilian billet structures.

(3) Ensure that curricula in individual and unit training programs and Military Department schools prepare personnel to support JIACG operations, in coordination with the Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

e. **Heads of DOD Components.** Support and access JIACG capabilities as effective mechanisms for information sharing, communication, coordination, cooperation, and collaboration in integrated operations.

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# CHAPTER IV

## JOINT INTERAGENCY COORDINATION GROUP EMPLOYMENT

*“During combat operations such as Operation ENDURING FREEDOM and Operation IRAQI FREEDOM or in foreign humanitarian assistance (FHA) operations such as PROVIDE COMFORT, DOD was the lead agency and was supported by other agencies. When DOD is tasked to provide military support to civil authorities, its forces perform in a supporting role. Whether supported or supporting, close coordination between the military and other non-DOD agencies is a key to successful interagency coordination.”*

**JP 3-08, *Interagency, Intergovernmental Organization, and Nongovernmental Organization Coordination, Volume I***

### 1. Introduction

a. The JIACG serves as the locus for facilitating the synchronization of interagency efforts in security cooperation, contingency, and crisis action planning. This chapter describes JIACG operations as a fully integrated element of the combatant command staff. It also provides a summary of the NSCS from which the interagency process flows downward to the combatant commands and facilitates the implementation of DOD external POLMIL relationships in the AOR.

b. The JIACG concentrates its efforts in five primary areas:

- (1) Maintains continuous connectivity with USG agencies and departments,
- (2) Assists in security cooperation planning,
- (3) Collaborates in joint operation planning,
- (4) Supports joint operations, and
- (5) Participates in training and exercises.

### 2. National Security Council System Overview

a. **Authority and Functions.** The NSC is the principal forum to advise the President on the integration of domestic, foreign, and military policies relating to national security and the NSCS. It advises and assists the President in integrating all aspects of national security policy. Together with supporting interagency working groups, steering groups, executive committees, and task forces, the NSCS provides the foundation for interagency coordination in the development and implementation of national security policy. **The NSC also serves as the President’s principal arm for coordinating policy among USG agencies and departments.**

b. **Membership.** The NSC is chaired by the President. Its regular attendees (both statutory and non-statutory) are the Vice President, the Secretary of State, the Secretary of the Treasury, the Secretary of Defense, and the Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs. The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff is the statutory military advisor to the NSC and the Director of National Intelligence is the intelligence advisor. The Chief of Staff to the President, Counsel to the President, and the Assistant to the President for Economic Policy are invited to attend any NSC meeting. The Attorney General and the Director of the Office of Management and Budget are invited to attend meetings pertaining to their responsibilities. The heads of other executive departments and agencies, as well as other senior officials, are invited to attend meetings of the NSC, when appropriate.

c. **NSC Organization.** The NSC tracks and directs the development, execution, and implementation of national security policies but does not normally implement policy. It takes a central coordinating or monitoring role in the development of policy, depending on the desires of the President and the National Security Advisor. NSPD-1 establishes three levels of formal interagency committees for coordinating and making decisions on national security issues. The advisory bodies include:

(1) NSC/PC is the senior cabinet-level interagency forum for policy issues affecting national security and includes: the Secretaries of State, Defense, and Treasury, the National Security Advisor, Director of National Intelligence, and Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. The NSC/PC meets at the call of and is chaired by the National Security Advisor.

(2) NSC/DC is the senior sub-cabinet-level interagency forum for policy affecting national security and directs the work of interagency working groups. The NSC/DC prescribes and reviews the work of the NSC Policy Coordination Committees (NSC/PCC). The NSC/DC ensures that NSC/PC issues have been properly analyzed and prepared for discussion. Composed of the deputies or under secretaries to the cabinet-level secretaries, the NSC/DC is responsible for crisis management and will task the appropriate NSC/PCC as the primary coordinating entity. The NSC/DC meets at the call of and is chaired by the Deputy National Security Advisor.

(3) Subordinate to the NSC/DC are the NSC/PCCs, which are interagency working groups that provide the forum for the coordination of national security policy. They manage the development and implementation of security policies by multiple agencies of the USG, provide analysis for consideration by the senior committees of the NSCS, and ensure timely responses to Presidential decisions. NSC/PCCs provide oversight of operations assigned by the NSC/DC. Each NSC/PCC includes representatives from the executive departments and offices and agencies represented in the NSC/DC and are organized based upon regional or functional issues. USG agency participation in the NSCS and these advisory bodies are depicted in Figure IV-1.

*For more information on the NSCS, refer to JP 3-08, Interagency, Intergovernmental Organization, and Nongovernmental Organization Coordination During Joint Operations VolI.*

| <b>NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL ORGANIZATION</b> |   |  |  |   |
|---|---|--|--|---|
|   | <b>Office of the Secretary of Defense</b>   | <b>Joint Staff</b>                         | <b>Department of State</b>                 | <b>Other Executive Branch</b>   |
| <b>NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL</b>              | Secretary of Defense  | Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff      | Secretary of State                         | President, Vice President, Secretary of the Treasury, Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs, Director of Central Intelligence, Chief of Staff to the President, Assistant to the President for Economic Policy, Attorney General, Director Office of Management and Budget (OMB), Counsel to the President |
| <b>PRINCIPALS COMMITTEE</b>                   | Secretary of Defense  | Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff      | Secretary of State                         | Secretary of the Treasury, Director of Central Intelligence, Chief of Staff to the President, Attorney General, Director OMB, Counsel to the President, Chief of Staff to the Vice President, Assistant to the President and Deputy National Security Advisor, et al.   |
| <b>DEPUTIES COMMITTEE</b>                     | Deputy Secretary of Defense or Undersecretary for Policy  | Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff | Deputy Secretary of State                  | Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs and other deputies of Principals   |
| <b>POLICY COORDINATION COMMITTEES (PCCs)</b>  |   |  |  |   |
| <b>PCCs - Regional</b>                        | Europe and Eurasia<br>East Asia<br>Near East and North Africa   |  | Western Hemisphere<br>South Asia<br>Africa |   |
| <b>PCCs - Functional</b>                      | Democracy, Human Rights, and International Operations<br>International Development and Humanitarian Assistance<br>Global Environment<br>International Finance<br>Transnational Economic Issues<br>Counterterrorism and National Preparedness<br>Defense Strategy, Force Structure, and Planning<br>Arms Control<br>Proliferation, Counterproliferation, and Homeland Defense<br>Intelligence and Counterintelligence<br>Records Access and Information Security |  |  |   |

Figure IV-1. National Security Council Organization

d. DOD Role in the NSCS

(1) DOD participants come from OSD and the JS. The Secretary of Defense (SecDef) is a member of the NSC and the NSC/PC and the Deputy Secretary of Defense is a member of the NSC/DC. In addition to membership, an under secretary of defense may chair a NSC/PCC.

(2) NSCS is the channel for the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff to discharge statutory responsibilities as the principal military advisor to the President, the SecDef, and NSC. The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff attends NSC meetings and provides advice and views. Other members of the Joint Chiefs of Staff may submit advice or an opinion in disagreement of or in addition to the advice or an opinion provided by the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

**(3) The Military Departments implement policy but do not participate directly in national security policy-making activities of the interagency process and are represented by the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.**

**e. Joint Staff Role in the NSCS**

(1) The JS provides input and staff support through the Chairman (or a designee) for policy decisions made by OSD. It coordinates with the combatant commands, Services, and USG agencies and departments and prepares appropriate directives, such as warning, alert, and execute orders, for SecDef approval. This preparation includes the definition of command and interagency relationships.

(2) When combatant commands require interagency coordination, the JS, in concert with OSD, routinely accomplishes that coordination.

(3) Within the JS, the offices of the Chairman, Secretary of the JS, and the Operations (J-3), Logistics (J-4), Plans and Policy (J-5), and Operational Plans and Joint Force Development (J-7) Directorates are focal points for NSC-related actions. The J-3 provides advice on execution of military operations, the J-4 assesses logistic implications of contemplated operations, and the J-5 often serves to focus DOD on a particular NSC matter for policy and planning purposes. Each of the JS directorates coordinates with the Military Departments to solicit Service input in the planning process. The SecDef also may designate one of the Services as the executive agent for direction and coordination of DOD activities in support of specific mission areas.

**f. CCDR's Role in the NSCS.** Although CCDRs sometimes participate in the interagency process by directly communicating with committees and groups of the NSCS and by working to integrate the military with diplomatic, economic, and informational instruments of national power; the normal conduit for information between the President, SecDef, NSC, and a CCDR is the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. CCDRs may communicate with the NSC/DC during development of the POLMIL plan, with the JS in a coordinating role.

### **3. Joint Interagency Coordination Group in Foreign Operations**

**a. Political-Military Domain.** DOS is the lead department overseeing the coordination of DOD external POLMIL relationships with overall US foreign policy. External DOD POLMIL relationships include:

- (1) Bilateral military relationships.
- (2) Coalition military forces.

(3) Multilateral mutual defense alliances.

(4) Treaties and agreements involving DOD activities or interests, such as technology transfer, armaments cooperation and control, international aviation, law of the sea, nuclear regulation, and environmental pollution.

(5) Use of US military assets for humanitarian or peace operations (including those conducted under UN auspices).

**b. Focal Point. The geographic CCDR implements DOD external POLMIL relationships within the AOR and is the focal point for planning and implementation of regional and theater military strategies that require interagency coordination.** The DOS focal point for formulation and implementation of regional foreign policy strategies requiring interagency coordination is the geographic bureau at DOS headquarters in Washington, DC. Although the CCDR will find it more expeditious to approach the US bilateral COMs for approval of an activity in regional HNs, often the political effect of the proposed US military activity goes far beyond the boundaries of the HN. The CCDR should not assume that the approval of the COM corresponds to region-wide approval of DOS, but rather should determine that the COM has received instructions from DOS to give region-wide approval.

c. In joint operations, interagency coordination will normally occur within the NSC/PCC and, if directed, during development of the POLMIL plan. **During lesser operations and operations not involving armed conflict, the CCDR's staff or JIACG may deal directly with a COM or members of the country team regarding issues that do not transcend the boundaries of the HN.** In some operations, a special envoy of the President or a special representative of the UN Secretary General may be involved.

d. The JIACG establishes regular, timely, and collaborative working relationships between civilian and military operational planners in the AOR. Composed of USG civilian and military experts and tailored to meet the requirements of a supported CCDR, the JIACG provides the commander with the capability to collaborate with USG civilian agencies and departments. JIACGs complement the interagency coordination that takes place at the strategic level through the NSCS. Members participate in contingency, crisis, and transfer to civil authority planning and provide links back to their parent civilian agencies to help synchronize operations with them (See Figure IV-2 for a model for coordination between military and nonmilitary organizations in foreign operations).

e. Campaign planning generally applies to the conduct of combat operations, but CCDRs and subordinate JFCs may be required to develop campaign plans across the range of military operations. A joint campaign plan is based on the commander's concept, which presents a broad vision of the required military end state to achieve the desired national strategic objectives and how operations will be conducted to achieve military objectives. **The campaign plan is an essential tool for laying out a clear, definable path linking the mission to the military end state. Such a plan helps political leaders visualize operational requirements for achieving national strategic objectives.** Given the systematic military approach to problem solving and the usual predominance of resources, it is often the supported CCDR who formally or informally functions as the lead organizer.




Figure IV-2. Model for Coordination Between Military and Nonmilitary Organizations - Foreign Operations

(1) The President or SecDef will promulgate strategic guidance to provide long-term, intermediate, or ancillary objectives. The CDR will determine how to implement guidance at the theater or operational level to achieve strategic objectives. Theater-level campaign planning is linked to operational design, which provides a framework to assist commanders in using resources efficiently and effectively, including interagency coordination, when producing campaign plans.

(2) To frame a campaign plan involving interagency capabilities, the commander must address the plan within the context of all the instruments of national power. **The CCDR will be guided by the interagency provisions of the POLMIL plan and will disseminate that guidance to the joint force in Annex V, Interagency Coordination, of the OPLAN. Annex V also assists the NSC and policy coordinating committee in producing POLMIL plans and describes the entry and exit conditions for USG agencies during the operation.** Interagency participation may be involved at the earliest phases of the joint operation or campaign. Important to the plan is the orderly flow of operations to the military end state and an efficient end of direct US military involvement. The development of Annex C, Operations, of the OPLAN should enhance early operational coordination with planners from the engaged USG agencies that will be involved in the operation's execution or its policy context. During interagency planning for contingencies, heavy combatant command involvement and coordination will be critical to success.

*For more guidance on Annex C, "Operations," and Annex V, "Interagency Coordination," refer to CJCSM 3122.03B, Joint Operation Planning and Execution System (JOPES) Volume II Planning Formats.*

f. Although contingency planning is conducted in anticipation of future events, there may be situations that call for an immediate US military response, e.g., noncombatant evacuation operations. CCDRs frequently develop COAs based on recommendations and considerations originating in one or more US embassies. In this regard, the country team is an invaluable resource because of its interagency experience and links to Washington, DC. The JIACG can provide additional collaboration with operational planners and USG agencies. Emergency action plans in force at every embassy cover a wide range of anticipated contingencies and crises and can assist the commanders in identifying COAs, options, and constraints to military actions and support activities. The staffs of geographic combatant commands also consult with the JS and other engaged USG agencies not represented on the country team or the JIACG to coordinate military operations and support activities.

## 4. Interagency Connectivity

a. The JIACG develops and maintains habitual relationships with key civilian individuals, organizations, and agencies. These relationships are established through collaboration early in the planning process and become the basis for expanding the JIACG's core capabilities and situational awareness as a crisis develops. A robust, established reach-back capability allows the JIACG to maintain these relationships during operations. JIACG connectivity should include, but not be limited to:

(1) The operational and planning environment in the CCDR's joint operations center, operations planning group, crisis action center, joint planning group, the joint intelligence operations center, and the SJFHQ. The JIACG closely monitors these organizations but does not duplicate their efforts.

(2) USG agencies and departments.

(3) Combatant command Service components.

(4) USG offices and missions located within the AOR.

(5) Centers of excellence, which may include organizations or institutions such as NGOs, academia, and industry that have particular expertise in areas such as governance. Examples include National Defense University, Foreign Service Institute, Institute for Defense Analysis, and the Kennedy School of Government. **However, the inclusion of centers of excellence may present challenges to the JIACG relative to security classification and limitations related to the sharing of operational information.**

b. The inclusion of USG civilian agency personnel into the JIACG allows for the integration of expertise into command planning and enhances information sharing between USG agencies and the military. **The responsibilities of USG agency representatives in the JIACG do not alter current civilian agency relationships.** Agency involvement in the JIACG does **NOT**:

(1) Replace any USG civilian agency staff officer currently assigned to the CCDR's staff or bypass any existing USG agency lines of authority and communications,

(2) Provide USG agency concurrence with internal DOD staffing actions,

(3) Interfere with existing memorandum of understanding for requests for assistance and other formal interagency request process,

(4) Challenge or replace the statutory and President-directed relationships for developing, implementing, or executing US national security and foreign policy,

(5) Create policy,

(6) Task personnel or USG agency elements, or

(7) Unilaterally commit USG agency resources.

## 5. Joint Strategic Planning

a. **General.** Planning for the employment of military forces is an inherent responsibility of command. It is performed at every echelon of command and across the range of military operations. Joint strategic planning integrates military actions with those of other instruments of national power and our multinational partners in time, space, and purpose to achieve a military end state. The military's contribution to national strategic planning consists of joint strategic planning with its three subsets: security cooperation planning, joint operation planning, and force planning (See Figure IV-3). This handbook focuses on the interagency aspects of security cooperation and joint operation planning. While force planning lies outside the scope of this handbook, the JIACG should be involved in the process due to the potential for competition for scarce resources and footprint among USG agencies.

b. **Security Cooperation Planning.** The JIACG maintains an understanding of the AOR, allowing it to make major contributions to the CCDR's security cooperation plan.




Figure IV-3. Joint Strategic Planning

Guided by the security cooperation plan, the JIACG, in concert with the FPA/POLAD's linkage to the DOS regional bureau and US ambassadors/COMs in the AOR, ensures the thinking of other Washington agencies is identified and integrated into the work of the combatant command staff. The goal is to establish an enhanced level of interagency cooperation in the combatant command to prevent a crisis or mitigate its effect.

#### KEY TERM

**Security Cooperation Planning.** The subset of joint strategic planning conducted to support the Department of Defense's security cooperation program. This planning supports a combatant commander's theater strategy.

**SOURCE:** JP 5-0, *Joint Operation Planning*

(1) Security cooperation is the means by which DOD encourages and enables countries and organizations to work to achieve strategic objectives. It consists of a focused program of bilateral and multilateral defense activities conducted with foreign countries to serve mutual security interests and build defense partnerships. These efforts also should be aligned with and support strategic communication themes, messages, and actions. The SecDef identifies security cooperation objectives, assesses the effectiveness of activities, and revises goals when required to ensure continued support for US interests abroad. Although they can shift over time, examples of typical security cooperation objectives include: creating favorable military regional balances of power; advancing

mutual defense or security arrangements; building allied and friendly military capabilities for self-defense and multinational operations; and preventing conflict and crisis.

(2) DOD senior civilian and military leadership, in conjunction with CCDRs, Service Chiefs, and support agencies, focus their activities on achieving the security cooperation objectives identified by the SecDef. Security cooperation planning links these activities with security cooperation objectives by identifying, prioritizing, and integrating them to optimize their overall contribution to specified US security interests.

(3) In response to direction in the DOD *Security Cooperation Guidance (SCG)*, CCDRs, Service Chiefs, and combat support agency directors prepare strategies in accordance with SCG objectives for Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff review and SecDef approval, with the CCDRs as the supported commanders. These strategies serve as the basis for security cooperation planning. **Collaboration among the combatant commands, Services, and combat support agencies is essential. Equally important is the close coordination with USG agencies that represent other instruments of national power, particularly with the ambassadors/COMs in the CCDRs' AORs.** The functional combatant commands, Services, and DOD agencies communicate their intended security cooperation activities to the supported CCDRs, execute their activities in support of approved security cooperation strategies, and assist in the annual assessment of the effectiveness of their security cooperation activities.

*For more information on guidelines and procedures for developing security cooperation strategies and plans, see DOD Security Cooperation Guidance.*

*For further discussion of facilitating coordination and cooperation with USG agencies, refer to JP 3-08, Interagency, Intergovernmental Organization, and Nongovernmental Organization Coordination During Joint Operations Vol I.*

### c. Joint Operation Planning

(1) Joint operation planning is the overarching process that guides JFCs in developing plans for the employment of military power within the context of national strategic objectives and national military strategy to shape events, meet contingencies, and respond to unforeseen crises. It includes contingency planning and CAP. Planning is triggered when the continuous monitoring of global events indicates the need to prepare military options. It is a collaborative process that can be iterative or parallel to provide actionable direction to commanders and their staffs across multiple echelons of command.

(2) Joint operation planning includes all activities that must be accomplished to plan for an anticipated operation, to include mobilization, deployment, employment, sustainment, redeployment, and demobilization of forces. **Planners recommend and commanders define criteria for the termination of joint operations and link these criteria to the transition to stabilization, enabling the civil authority phase, and achievement of the military end state.**

## KEY TERM

**Joint Operation Planning.** Planning activities associated with joint military operations by combatant commanders and their subordinate joint force commanders in response to contingencies and crises. Joint operation planning includes planning for the mobilization, deployment, employment, sustainment, redeployment, and demobilization of joint forces.

**SOURCE:** JP 5-0, *Joint Operation Planning*

(3) **Contingency Planning.** Contingency planning occurs in noncrisis situations. A contingency is a situation that likely would involve military forces in response to natural and man-made disasters, terrorists, subversives, military operations by foreign powers, or other situations as directed by the President or SecDef.

## KEY TERM

**Contingency Planning.** The Joint Operation Planning and Execution System planning activities that occur in noncrisis situations. The Joint Planning and Execution Community uses contingency planning to develop operation plans for a broad range of contingencies based on requirements identified in the Contingency Planning Guidance, Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan, or other planning directive. Contingency planning underpins and facilitates the transition to crisis action planning.

**SOURCE:** JP 5-0, *Joint Operation Planning*

(a) The JIACG core element maintains a comprehensive understanding of potential crisis regions in the AOR. Its engagement with the combatant command planning elements will be driven by a number of requirements: current events, security cooperation plan activities, tasks derived from the *Contingency Planning Guidance (CPG)*, *Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan (JSCP)*, or *Unified Command Plan (UCP)*.

(b) **JIACG planners will be key participants in developing and updating routine contingency plans. Their expertise will be a crucial backstop against which J-5 and SJFHQ (CE) planners can clarify and confirm strategic guidance, planning assumptions, and engaged USG agency roles and missions.** Their expertise will be particularly useful during transition operations and plan congruence and support to US embassy mission performance plans, USAID Five-Year Plans, and USG agency regional planning goals.

(c) JIACG planners should be closely involved with J-5 planners' efforts to update existing plans and interagency coordination annexes (Annex V to OPLANs), as well as developing new plans for crisis response and deterrence.

(d) Each instrument of national power has a finite capacity. Interagency activities must be planned in a synchronized manner to maximize and focus the efforts of multiple USG agencies toward a military end state. **The JIACG role in advising the CCDR of interagency priorities and actions is important in setting the stage for hand-off from the preponderant military phases of the operation to the USG civilian agency-dominated phases.**

(4) **Crisis Action Planning (CAP).** A crisis is an incident or situation involving a threat to the United States, its territories, citizens, military forces, possessions, or vital interests. It typically develops rapidly and creates a condition of such diplomatic, economic, political, or military importance that the President or SecDef considers a commitment of US military forces and resources to achieve national strategic objectives. It may occur with little or no warning. It is fast-breaking and requires accelerated decisionmaking. Sometimes a single crisis may spawn another crisis elsewhere. JOPES provides additional CAP procedures for time-sensitive development of OPORDs for the likely use of military forces in response to a crisis.

#### KEY TERM

**Crisis Action Planning. One of the two types of joint operation planning. The Joint Operation Planning and Execution System process involving the time-sensitive development of joint operation plans and operation orders for the deployment, employment, and sustainment of assigned and allocated forces and resources in response to an imminent crisis. Crisis action planning is based on the actual circumstances that exist at the time planning occurs.**

**SOURCE: JP 5-0, *Joint Operation Planning***

#### (a) Pre-Crisis

1. Designated members of the JIACG monitor events in the AOR as part of their daily activities. They are responsible for assisting the CCDR and the combatant command staff's understanding of USG agency activities, both in the AOR and in Washington, DC, that impact on current and future operations.

2. JIACG members augment and are integrated into the combatant command prior to and during operations. **The number and assignment of JIACG members is mission and event dependent, particularly in planning and execution efforts that require interagency coordination.** The implementation of mission tasks embodies parallel, simultaneous, multiagency efforts through time. The JIACG tracks and recommends adjustments to the military tasks in collaboration and coordination with engaged USG agencies and multinational partners to create and reinforce unified action across all mission areas.

3. In a developing crisis, the JIACG's knowledge and understanding of the planning and policy objectives at the national level assist the combatant command staff in developing and recommending an OPLAN that harmonizes military and civilian operational response actions. The daily roles and responsibilities of the JIACG shift to focus on the potential crisis and expand to become an integral part of the overall crisis prevention effort.

**4. The JIACG, through its continuing coordination with external USG civilian agencies, refines its collaboration by aligning the right membership to support the developing OPLANs and OPORDs.** JIACG crisis response activities and actions facilitate the initial situational awareness of the crisis action team and operations planning group, support flexible deterrent options and force enhancement execution, and make preparation to deploy designated member(s) to the crisis area or forward headquarters, as required.

(b) Crisis

1. When a crisis occurs, information is provided to the appropriate NSC/PCC, usually by assistant secretary-level representatives of the appropriate USG agencies. Issues are analyzed and framed by the NSC/PCC for discussion within the NSC/DC. The NSC/DC further analyzes the issues and develops policy options for the NSC/PC. The NSC/PC then recommends appropriate action to the President. **Although initial planning may be undertaken early in the combatant command, official interagency planning does not commence until the NSC/DC authorizes it and tasks the NSC/PCC to begin POLMIL planning.**

2. The NSC/PCC provides oversight of interagency planning and develops the POLMIL plan. The POLMIL plan describes the concept of operations for US participation and addresses the mission and national strategic objectives and end state and is further used to harmonize interagency plans and actions.

3. The JIACG continues to monitor the evolving situation by maintaining a physical and/or virtual presence in the CDR's joint operations center and joint intelligence operations center. The JIACG augments these centers, as required. Once a situation is identified as a crisis, JIACG members are integrated into the combatant command staff as prescribed in local instructions and directives. **The JIACG will assist the SJFHQ (CE) and the JTF, when formed, to provide interagency connectivity by either deploying or providing reach-back.** The JIACG becomes the responsible staff element for integrating information and understanding of USG agency activities. Its members respond to and assist in answering information requirements that fill critical gaps in the CAP effort.

**4. JIACG actions are the most dynamic during the stabilize and transfer to civil authority phases.** Its virtual network builds on the previous collaborative planning efforts and adjusts to changing mission tasks. This underscores the need to identify the right interagency participants, engage them in the military plan, surface issues and discontinuities, and get agreement on task responsibility early in the process.

**5. As the transition process continues over time, the roles among USG agencies will likely change as intermediate military objectives are achieved. These role adjustments will include the transfer of responsibilities and relationships among military and USG agencies.** JIACG collaboration and coordination with USG agencies assists the operations team in sorting accountability among the participants at the operational level for execution of multi-functional tasks.

**(c) Post-Crisis**

1. The US military has long been involved in post-crisis stability operations and will likely continue to be so involved. However, the US military should not be viewed as the dominant participant in reconstruction efforts. Although military force has a primary role in initially establishing a stable environment, myriad USG agencies have a comparative advantage in addressing the wide range of reconstitution needs. NGOs, the private sector, IGOs, multilateral banks, and civilian agencies from multiple donor nations all have a role in addressing security, civil administration, governance, justice and reconciliation, economic and social needs.

2. Post-crisis recovery and reconstitution implementation, like transition, is guided by national security policy objectives. They build on the OPLAN and adjust to events on the ground. Moreover, the tasks and accountability among various agencies and donors will likely change over time. These adjustments will likely modify supported and supporting roles among military and civilian, international, private, and commercial agencies and organizations. JIACG habitual relationships and collaboration with USG agencies assist the CDR in adapting to the changing roles and responsibilities among the participants.

3. When pre-planned conditions are met, the recovery and reconstitution authority will transfer to civilian leadership. This civilian authority should have immediate access to the JFC, military logistics, security support, and consultations on interagency planning and execution. **The JIACG role as an interlocutor is substantial. The expanding number of civilian organizations and agencies that will have actual or perceived equities in post-crisis operations will need immediate access to military planning and/or resources for coordinating support requirements.**

**JOINT INTERAGENCY COORDINATION GROUP SUPPORT TO THE STAFF**

The exercise of the Joint Interagency Coordination Group (JIACG) during exercise TERMINAL FURY '05 was successful. The prototype demonstrated merit in the eyes of the staff, the command group, and the home and supporting agencies in Washington, DC. Actions of the JIACG contributed to better staff products and recommendations to the command group. Increasing participation by US Pacific Command staff, joint task force staff, and Washington, DC agencies support the idea that the JIACG demonstrated, in a "market" of coordination mechanisms, that it had value in providing information and coordination opportunities that would not exist if the JIACG did not exist. It became a valuable "place to go" to get information and a clearinghouse for discussing and vetting policy and operational options.

**SOURCE: US Pacific Command Exercise TERMINAL FURY '05**

4. One final responsibility of the NSC/PCC during post-crisis, with considerable input from the combatant command JIACG, is to conduct an after-action review that analyzes the actions conducted during the crisis and prepares lessons learned for consideration during future operations.

## 6. Information Operations

Non-DOD USG agencies and departments may have a role in planning and executing IO that supports strategic communication. The expertise, programs, and activities of a wide variety of non-DOD USG agencies should be considered as part of the IO plan, when appropriate. CCDRs establish staff procedures specific to their AORs for requesting interagency support and coordination of various aspects of joint operations. The JIACG is well-positioned to help the CCDR and IO planners coordinate a “single voice” for IO conducted during actual operations or training events. **Although IO is not its primary duty, JIACG connectivity to the Washington, DC, interagency community is an important enabler during development of the strategic communication plan for major operations.**

### KEY TERM

**Strategic Communication.** Focused United States Government efforts to understand and engage key audiences to create, strengthen or preserve conditions favorable for the advancement of United States Government interests, policies, and objectives through the use of coordinated programs, plans, themes, messages, and products synchronized with the actions of all instruments of national power.

**SOURCE:** JP 1-02, *Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms*

## 7. Training and Exercises

a. Continuous training and exercise support is essential to the success of the CCDR’s readiness to plan for and respond to various contingencies. Training focuses on applying lessons learned, improving use of collaboration and decision-support tools, understanding command relationships, and improving lines of communication. Mission-based training improves vertical and horizontal communication, identifies seams and friction points, ensures combat readiness of individual and collective skills in the event of a contingency, and develops and maintains key staff and component informational relationships necessary for effective joint operation planning and execution.

b. Training takes place not only within the headquarters, but also as part of the CCDR’s exercise and engagement activities throughout the AOR. **Integration of the JIACG and linkage to interagency partners with the combatant command staff provides an opportunity to train together and develop working relationships essential to efficient staff work and successful joint operations.** Training opportunities include:

(1) Participating in exercises with the combatant command staff, component headquarters, and USG agencies and departments. These exercises provide the CCDR the opportunity to assess the value and currency of the procedures in use, as well as to build stronger relationships among those military commands and USG agencies that might be utilized when organizing and responding to contingencies.

#### CIVILIAN PARTICIPATION IN PLANNING

**During US Pacific Command's (USPACOM) exercise TERMINAL FURY-04, USJFCOM's prototype joint interagency coordination group, developed to include and test robust Washington, DC reach-back, demonstrated that civilian input to the planning process can have a significant impact on course of action development and set the stage for successful post-conflict operations. An unexpected but positive benefit of the reach-back network established for the exercise occurred three weeks later, when it was re-activated by the USPACOM staff to assist in supporting tsunami relief efforts.**

**SOURCE: US Pacific Command Exercise TERMINAL FURY '04**

(2) Training JIACG members on processes and procedures for joint operation planning, their responsibilities, staff relationships, collaborative tools, and interagency coordination and integration with military operations.

(3) Training selected personnel external to the JIACG on the use of communication and collaboration tools to optimize mutually supportive decision-support systems of participating USG agencies and departments.

(4) Training USG agency partners that would potentially augment JIACG planning and operations. This augmentation may be on-site, virtual, or deployed. The training is aimed at developing a coherent team requiring minimum pre-deployment training with emphasis on the CCDR's contingency planning and implementation processes.

c. During the initial stages of a developing crisis, the CCDR may direct the staff to coordinate and participate in crisis-specific training. The JIACG is an integral element of this training. This training may range from a small internal staff training exercise to training with a potential JTF and components. The JIACG is responsible for identifying the appropriate USG agency participants, surfacing the relevant issues, and coordinating the necessary training. Depending on the timeline and venue, this training may be on-site or virtual. Finally, the JIACG continues to conduct internal training as required for individual replacements and augmentation personnel to maintain core skills proficiency.

d. **JIACG planners should ensure that interagency concerns, priorities, and requirements are a part of any exercise or training plan.** Consideration should be given to drafting a comprehensive listing of master scenario events that contains both routine events and, when possible, scenario-specific events to stress the interagency linkages with combatant command operations.

# APPENDIX A

## JOINT INTERAGENCY COORDINATION GROUP PLANNING CHECKLIST

The development of the JIACG has presented the joint community a number of challenges as roles, relationships, and organization have been examined and debated. There is no universal agreement on the specific use of the JIACG and the evolution has been driven by experimentation, joint exercises, rehearsals, and real-world joint operations. This has resulted in the compilation of “best practices” that hopefully will continue the maturation of the JIACG in joint doctrine. The following is provided to continue that evolution and build upon the techniques in the handbook and the effort to shape the JIACG.

### 1. Configuration of the Joint Interagency Coordination Group

- a. Develop a personnel list, by grade and USG agency, that should be assigned to the JIACG.
- b. Identify the functional skills (civilian and military occupation categories) and experience necessary for the JIACG to address potential mission areas.
- c. Determine the relationship between civilian members of the JIACG and their parent agencies. Ascertain how long they need to be assigned to the JIACG and their assignment status (on loan to the JIACG, on temporary assignment, or transferred to DOD). Do they need to be able to accept taskings from their parent agencies while working for the JIACG?
- d. Determine JIACG C2 requirements and what the reporting chain of command should be.
- e. Define the relationship between JIACG members, the JIACG as an organization, and the other staff directorates within the combatant command headquarters.
- f. Locate and prepare the physical location of the JIACG in relation to the other combatant command staff directorates.
- g. Determine and install the tools the JIACG will need to accomplish its work:
  - (1) Computers (type and capacity) and collaborative software.
  - (2) Network connections (Internet, Non-Secure Internet Protocol Router Network), SECRET Internet Protocol Router Network)
  - (3) Telephones (non-secure and secure).
  - (4) Faxes (non-secure and secure).
  - (5) Blackboards, white boards, map displays, etc.

(6) Rosters/points of contact within the combatant command, Service components, SJFHQ (CE), USG agencies and departments, multinational, multilateral, nongovernmental, and commercial organizations.

(7) Databases and documentation in the JIACG (automated and hard copy)

(8) Reach-back capability to USG agencies and multinational or multilateral sources

## 2. Joint Interagency Coordination Group Tasks

a. Identify the authorities or mandates that should be assigned to the JIACG based on the current situation.

b. Review and assess the JIACG tasks required to be accomplished during routine military engagement; recognizing that the global war on terrorism, war on drugs, and other non-DOD tasks may concurrently place other USG agencies and departments in a crisis mode in some other region or nation.

(1) Identify the organizations with which the JIACG should be in contact and the frequency of those contacts. For example, combatant commands, Service components, JTF and SJFHQ (CE) staff directorates, USG agencies and departments and the offices within these agencies and departments, and non-US organizations.

(2) Describe what the nature of these contacts should be. For example, to obtain or provide information, contribute to combatant command security cooperation planning and parent agency engagement activities, perform analysis of a nation or region in the non-military functional area of expertise, and coordinate activities (within the headquarters, between the headquarters and USG agencies in Washington, DC, or the region, with multinational, multilateral, or other organizations, etc.)

c. Describe what the JIACG primary tasks should be during pre-crisis, crisis, or post-crisis.

(1) Perform all tasks considered during routine military engagement listed above in paragraph 2 b.

(2) Review, assess, and adjust, if necessary, the capability of the JIACG to sustain the combatant command staff battle rhythm and still provide the staff and Service component staffs with essential support.

(3) Determine what part of the JIACG should deploy forward with the SJFHQ (CE) during pre-crisis and crisis modes. If resources are not deployed, determine what virtual connections are appropriate to support the deployed headquarters.

(4) Identify what other interagency members or those in US missions and multilateral organizations should collaboratively participate with the JIACG.

d. Determine which JIACG personnel, particularly those dealing with functional coalitions, would be better suited if positioned elsewhere in the region while maintaining collaboration with the combatant command headquarters.

### **3. Internal Activities within the Joint Interagency Coordination Group**

a. Describe and quantify the type of actions the JIACG should accomplish. For example, studies, short-fuse responses, email exchange, data collection, operational actions, and administrative actions.

b. Develop a list of who should initiate work. For example, tasks originated from the combatant command command group, other combatant command staff action requirements, self-initiated ideas, and requests from parent agencies or other external organizations.

c. Describe the types of action the JIACG should take to complete tasks. For example, oral or written response via phone, fax, or email; prepare a briefing; send a message, staff section visit, or a trip to an external location; and conduct or participate in a meeting.

d. Document the track record of meeting task suspenses, both those externally directed and internally established.

### **4. Data and Information Exchange Requirements of the Joint Interagency Coordination Group**

a. Identify what types of data and information the JIACG should have on hand or readily available. For example, non-DOD functional data and information, DOD-related data and information, data and information on capabilities of potential partners, and general or specific geographic and demographic data and information.

b. Describe how the data and information should be made available to the JIACG. For example, hard copy volumes, electronic databases, reach-back to USG agencies or reach forward to country teams and other multinational or multilateral partners and accessed through web-pages or Internet connections, telephonic or fax queries, and maps and geographic information system displays.

c. Determine how and with whom the JIACG exchanges data and information (telephone, fax, Internet, etc.) (combatant command staff, USG agencies in Washington, DC, or in the region, multinational or multilateral organizations, others).

d. Determine what constraints should be imposed on the JIACG for the exchange of classified or sensitive information. These constraints may be caused by:

- (1) USG information disclosure laws and regulations.
- (2) Multinational and multilateral partner procedures.

e. Determine if and what constraints are critical to carrying out assigned responsibilities.

f. Determine what disclosure constraints exist and determine if they should be modified or removed during an actual contingency operation. Identify who should have authority to modify or remove disclosure constraints.

g. Describe how JIACG data and information should contribute to:

(1) Supporting military coalition and non-military needs at the strategic-theater and operational levels.

(2) Collaborating among the military coalition and interagency partners conducting the operation.

h. Determine what JIACG contributions are timely and at a comparable level with other combatant command staff directorates.

## 5. Describe the Decision Support and Collaboration Tools

a. Describe what data and information should be processed by the JIACG.

(1) Describe how the data and information was processed (manually, using automated tools like spreadsheets, or more complex computer models, etc.).

(2) Determine if analytical support tools are available to the JIACG to assist with the processing of data and information.

(3) Identify the organizations that are the major customers of processed JIACG information.

(a) Combatant command or Service component headquarters, SJFHQ (CE);

(b) Non-DOD agencies in Washington, DC, or in the region;

(c) Multinational or multilateral organizations; and/or

(d) Others.

b. Identify the tools that are required for the JIACG to collaborate with other organizations and their level of classification.

(1) Combatant command, Service component, and JTF headquarters staffs;

(2) Non-DOD USG agencies in Washington, DC, and the region;

(3) Multinational and multilateral partner organizations; and/or

(4) Nongovernmental and commercial organizations.

c. Determine if available tools allowed the JIACG to provide timely and accurate data and information to the combatant command staff and other partners and correct any shortfalls.

## **6. Performance of the Joint Interagency Coordination Group**

a. Determine what necessary and useful capabilities the JIACG should have contributed to the:

- (1) combatant command staff,
- (2) subunified commands,
- (3) JTFs,
- (4) Service component headquarters,
- (5) SJFHQ (CE),
- (6) non-DOD parent agencies of USG represented on the JIACG,
- (7) other multinational and multilateral partners, and
- (8) nongovernmental or commercial partners.

b. Identify what other USG agencies should be represented in the JIACG and their contribution.

c. Identify what doctrine, organization, training, materiel, leadership and education, personnel, and facilities (DOTMLPF) capability enhancements would improve JIACG performance.

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## APPENDIX B

### JOINT INTERAGENCY COORDINATION GROUP UNIVERSAL JOINT TASK LIST TASKS

1. The UJTL is a comprehensive and integrated menu of functional tasks, conditions, measures, and criteria supporting all levels of DOD in executing the National Defense Strategy and the National Military Strategy. The UJTL provides a training reference system for various users, to include JFCs, joint force developers, combat support personnel, joint experimentation agencies, exercise designers, and joint trainers.

*For more information on the UJTL, refer to the searchable database in the Joint Doctrine, Education and Training Electronic Information System (JDEIS) located on the JDEIS Web Portal at: <https://jdeis.js.mil>, and CJCSM 3500.04D, Universal Joint Task List (UJTL).*

2. Derived from the UJTL, the tasks that may have direct or indirect implications for the JIACG include the following:

a. Strategic National Tasks (SN)

(1) SN 5.4.2, Coordinate Support for Unified, Joint and Multinational Operations.

(2) SN 8, Foster Multinational and Interagency Relations.

(3) SN 8.1, Support Other Nations or Groups.

(4) SN 8.1.3, Support Peace Operations.

(5) SN 8.1.5, Conduct Foreign Humanitarian Assistance and Humanitarian and Civic Assistance.

(6) SN 8.1.9, Cooperate With and Support Nongovernmental Organizations.

(7) SN 8.2.2, Support Other Government Agencies.

(8) SN 8.2.3, Support Evacuation of Noncombatants from Theaters.

(9) SN 8.3, Coordinate Military Activities within the Interagency Process.

(10) SN 8.3.2, Conduct Information Management in the Interagency Process.

(11) SN 8.3.3, Establish Interagency Cooperation Structures.

b. Strategic Theater Tasks (ST)

(1) ST 5.2.2, Assess National and Multinational Strategy.

(2) ST 5.2.4, Review International Security Considerations.

(3) ST 5.4.3, Establish or Participate in a Joint, Combined or Multinational Force.

(4) ST 5.5.1, Plan and Integrate Theater-Wide Information Operations.

(5) ST 8.1, Coordinate Coalitions, Alliances, Regional Relations and Security Assistance Activities.

(6) ST 8.1.1, Enhance Regional Political-Military Relations.

(7) ST 8.1.3, Develop Headquarters or Organizations for Coalitions.

(8) ST 8.1.4, Develop Multinational Intelligence/Information Sharing Structures.

(9) ST 8.2, Provide Support to Allies, Regional Governments, International Organizations or Groups.

(10) ST 8.2.2, Coordinate Civil Affairs in Theater.

(11) ST 8.2.3, Coordinate Foreign Humanitarian Assistance.

(12) ST 8.2.8, Support Peace Operations in Theater.

(13) ST 8.2.10, Coordinate Multinational Operations within Theater.

(14) ST 8.2.11, Cooperate With and Support NGOs in Theater.

(15) ST 8.4.3, Coordinate Evacuation and Repatriation of Noncombatants from Theater.

(16) ST 8.5, Integrate Military Operations with Regional Interagency Activities.

(17) ST 8.5.3, Establish Theater Interagency Cooperation Structure.

c. Operational Tasks (OP)

(1) OP 4.7, Provide Political-Military Support to Other Nations, Groups and Government Agencies.

(2) OP 4.7.5, Coordinate Political-Military Support.

(3) OP 4.7.6, Coordinate Civil Affairs in the Joint Operations Area.

(4) OP 5.2, Assess Operational Situation.

(5) OP 5.2.2, Formulate Crisis Assessment.

(6) OP 5.3, Prepare Plans and Orders.

(7) OP 5.3.1 through OP 5.3.9, Note: These are the nine operational-level planning tasks.

(8) OP 5.7, Coordinate and Integrate Joint/Multinational and Interagency Support.

(9) OP 5.7.2, Determine National/Agency Capabilities and Limitations.

(10) OP 5.7.3, Develop Multinational Intelligence/Information Sharing Structures.

(11) OP 5.7.4, Coordinate Plans with Non-DOD Organizations.

(12) OP 5.7.6, Coordinate Coalition Support.

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# APPENDIX C

## JOINT INTERAGENCY COORDINATION GROUP POSITION DESCRIPTIONS AND QUALIFICATIONS

### 1. General

Appendix C provides recommended position descriptions and qualifications for key personnel assigned to a JIACG. These positions include the following:

Director, Joint Interagency Coordination Group  
US Government agency and department representatives:  
US Agency for International Development  
Department of Commerce (DOC)  
Department of Health and Human Services (DHHS)  
Department of Homeland Security (DHS)  
Department of Justice  
Department of State  
Department of the Treasury  
JIACG Information Manager  
JIACG Subject Matter Experts (Non-JIACG Core Members)

### 2. Director, Joint Interagency Coordination Group

a. **Position.** Director, JIACG provides support to the combatant commands' security cooperation, contingency, and crisis action planning, coordination, and execution.

b. **Fill.** USG agency senior executive service (SES) or DOS, senior foreign service officer (S/FSO)

c. **Grade.** SES or S/FSO

#### d. Primary Duties

(1) Direct the efforts of the JIACG in providing the interagency perspective and input to security cooperation, contingency, and crisis action planning.

(2) Advise senior officers of the combatant command planning staff, FPA/POLAD, and CCDR on interagency perspectives, capabilities, and planning inputs.

(3) Assist in planning and interagency coordination of theater security efforts.

(4) Develop and maintain contacts in appropriate offices of USG agencies and departments and the NSC.

(5) Provide input to POLMIL plans.

(6) Advise engaged USG agencies and departments on the combatant command's planning and security cooperation activities relevant to on-going/planned USG programs in the AOR.

(7) Develop and maintain contacts with senior officers/officials in the US embassies and IGOs in the AOR.

(8) Facilitate interagency coordination in planning and implementing theater security activities.

(9) Anticipate potential operational problems, assess the impact and potential reactions, and draft papers and reports as needed for USG agencies and the combatant command's planning staff.

(10) Participate in the practical implementation and refinement of the JIACG composition, processes, and procedures.

e. **Experience.** Academic and professional experience that ensures:

(1) Substantial knowledge of USG policies and strategies, and the ability to assess the relevancy and implications for combatant command planning and security cooperation activities.

(2) Detailed familiarity with USG regional strategy, objectives, and programs to provide expert analytical and advisory guidance that is responsive to the planning needs of the combatant command staff.

(3) Thorough understanding of the NSC interagency process.

(4) Understanding of military command structure and contingency and crisis action planning.

(5) Ability to integrate interagency considerations and resources into joint operation planning and coordination.

f. **Security Clearance.** Requires a current DOD or equivalent USG agency or department security clearance at the top secret/sensitive compartmented information level that has been favorably completed and updated within the last five years.

g. **Assignment Data.** Optimally, assignment is for two years, renewable for an additional year.

### 3. Position Descriptions and Qualifications - USG Agencies and Departments (Standard Requirements)

a. **Position.** Provide support to the combatant command JIACG for security cooperation, contingency, and crisis action planning, coordination, and execution.

b. **Fill.** Civilian (direct hire/contract) (USAID/DOC/DHHS/DHS/DOJ/TREAS); FSO (DOS)

c. **Grade.** GS-14/15/FS-2/1 or equivalent contract employee (USAID); GS-14/15/NSPS Pay Band 3 or equivalent contract employee (DOC/DHHS/DHS/DOJ/ TREAS); FS-2/1 level (DOS)

**d. Primary Duties**

(1) Assist in planning and interagency coordination of combatant command security cooperation efforts.

(2) Develop and maintain contacts and advise appropriate offices in USG agencies and departments in Washington, DC, regarding combatant command plans and activities relevant to on-going and planned USG agency programs in the AOR.

(3) Employ collaboration (reach-back) and share information with USG agency/ Washington, DC, offices and combatant command staff in support of combatant command interagency coordination efforts.

(4) Anticipate potential operational problems, assess impact and congressional reaction, and draft position papers for interagency staffing.

(5) Participate in practical implementation and refinement of JIACG composition, processes, and procedures.

**e. Qualifications**

(1) **Experience**

(a) Recent field experience in the AOR.

(b) Ability to integrate relevant USG agency or department issues into combatant command joint operation planning and coordination.

(2) **Security Clearance.** Current DOD or equivalent USG agency or department security clearance at the top secret/sensitive compartmented information level that has been favorably completed and updated within the last five years.

f. **Assignment Data.** Optimally, assignment is for one year, renewable for an additional year by mutual consent of the USG agency, DOD, and JIACG director.

## 4. Primary Duties and Experience - USG Agencies and Departments

**a. US Agency for International Development**

(1) **Primary Duties**

(a) Provide technical advice and perspective to the JIACG in support of the CCDR and staff on economic and social development issues relevant to the AOR and theater security responsibilities.

(b) Provide USAID regional/country-specific development perspective and input to support combatant command security cooperation, contingency, and crisis action planning.

(2) **Experience.** Academic and professional experience that ensures:

(a) Knowledge of USG agency economic assistance policies and strategies to assess their relevancy and implications for US foreign policy.

(b) Familiarity with USG agency regional strategy, objectives, and programs to provide expert analytical and advisory guidance that is responsive to planning needs of the combatant command.

### **b. Department of Commerce**

(1) **Primary Duties.** Provide technical advice and perspective to the JIACG in support of the CCDR on international commercial law and treaties, international trade and investment issues, and other commercial matters of interest in the AOR.

(2) **Experience.** Academic and professional experience that ensures:

(a) Knowledge of international law and economics as it relates to the full range of CAP and military engagement, including application of military force.

(b) Familiarity with US regional foreign commercial interests to provide legal and economic analyses, advice, and guidance that is responsive to the planning needs of the combatant command.

### **c. Department of Health and Human Services**

(1) **Primary Duties**

(a) Provide technical advice and perspective to the JIACG in support of the CCDR and staff on health sector issues relevant to the AOR and security cooperation responsibilities.

(b) Provide regional and country-specific perspective on existing health systems' capabilities and infrastructure.

(2) **Experience.** Academic and professional experience that ensures:

(a) Knowledge of health care systems, public health, and direct medical care.

(b) Knowledge of international health issues, standards, and organizations.

(c) Familiarity with US regional policy interests, strategy, objectives, and programs and ability to provide advice that is relevant for combatant command planning, in all phases, as well as security cooperation activities.

(d) Functional expertise in two or more of the following: direct medical care, public health and sanitation, humanitarian healthcare, disaster medicine, executive-level healthcare management, preventative medicine, international healthcare, civil-military relations and operations, or health education and training.

**d. Department of Homeland Security**

**(1) Primary Duties**

(a) Provide technical advice and perspective to the JIACG in support of the CCDR and staff on national security matters of interest to the DHS (e.g., terrorist threats and activities in the AOR).

(b) Provide perspective on broadly defined national security issues and input to support combatant command security cooperation, contingency, and crisis action planning and execution.

**(2) Experience.** Academic and professional experience that ensures:

(a) Knowledge of national security issues as it relates to the full range of joint operation planning and military engagement, including application of military force.

(b) Familiarity with US regional defense interests to provide analyses on national security requirements, advice, and guidance that is responsive to planning needs of the combatant command.

**e. Department of Justice**

**(1) Primary Duties**

(a) Provide technical advice and perspective to the CCDR and staff on international law, human rights, administration of justice, and legal reform and related matters pertinent to the AOR.

(b) Provide broadly defined international law and administration of justice perspective and input to support combatant command security cooperation, contingency, and crisis action planning.

**(2) Experience.** Academic and professional experience that ensures:

(a) Knowledge of international law as it relates to the full range of military planning and engagement, including application of military force.

(b) Familiarity with US regional foreign policy interests to provide legal analysis, advice, and guidance that is responsive to planning needs of the combatant command.

**f. Department of State**

**(1) Primary Duties**

(a) Provide DOS perspective to the JIACG in support of the CCDR and staff on bilateral and multilateral issues relevant to the AOR and theater security responsibilities.

(b) Provide DOS regional and country-specific perspective and input to support combatant command's security cooperation, contingency, and crisis action planning.

(c) Develop and maintain contacts with counterparts in US country teams in the AOR.

(d) Develop and maintain contacts with NGOs and IGOs in the AOR.

**(2) Experience.** Academic and professional experience that ensures:

(a) Knowledge of USG policies and strategies, and the ability to assess their relevancy and implications for combatant command planning and security cooperation activities.

(b) Familiarity with USG regional strategy, objectives, and programs to provide expert analytical and advisory guidance that is responsive to planning needs of the combatant command staff.

(c) Knowledge of US mission plans in the AOR.

(d) Functional expertise in one or more of the following areas: public diplomacy; counter-narcotics; counterterrorism; international law enforcement; US trade and commercial policy; human rights; IGOs; stability operations; noncombatant evacuation operations; political-military affairs; refugee affairs; area/language expertise; democracy promotion and governance; political, economic or consular cone specialization; or principal officer or multifunctional experience.

**g. Department of the Treasury**

**(1) Primary Duties**

(a) Provide technical advice and perspective to the JIACG in support of the CCDR and staff on international trade, finance and investment issues, and other economic and financial matters of interest in the AOR.

(b) Provide perspective on broadly defined macroeconomic as well as international economic and financial issues and input to support combatant command security cooperation, contingency, and crisis action planning.

(2) **Experience.** Academic and professional experience that ensures:

(a) Knowledge of macroeconomics as well as international economics and finance as it relates to the full range of military planning and engagement, including application of military force.

(b) Familiarity with US regional foreign economic and financial policy interests to provide economic and financial analysis, advice, and guidance that is responsive to planning needs of the combatant command.

## 5. Joint Interagency Coordination Group Information Manager

a. **Role.** Manage and integrate JIACG information resources and products. Coordinate with interagency partners to facilitate the dissemination of information from and to the JIACG.

### b. Responsibilities

(1) Information Management

(a) Identify, collect, assess, categorize, organize, store, disseminate, communicate, and maintain information.

(b) Maintain SME personnel information (name, position, SME area, contact information), as required.

(c) Coordinate collaborative workspace(s).

(d) Collect, assess, store, and disseminate relevant observations, lessons learned, and best practices.

(2) Information Integration

(a) Work with JIACG members, engaged USG agencies and departments, and CCDRs or JTF commanders to process information for the development and implementation of plans, policies, strategies, and other JIACG activities.

(b) Create, advocate, and/or sponsor the creation of relevant JIACG communities of practice.

c. **Experience.** Academic and professional experience in:

(1) Data management.

(2) Process engineering/re-engineering.

(3) Planning (strategic, operational, and tactical).

(4) Organizational design/culture.

d. **Grade.** GS-13/14/NSPS Pay Band 2 or 3

## 6. JIACG Subject Matter Experts

a. **Other USG Agency and Department Representatives.** It is anticipated that various CAP efforts may require combatant commands to have access to technical expertise and/or country and regional insights from other USG agencies and departments, such as the Department of Energy, Department of Agriculture, and Department of Transportation, among others. As access to this expertise will be situation-dependent, there is no immediate requirement for them to assign full-time (core element) staff to the JIACG.

b. **Assignment.** Near-term, the JIACG director should assign each core element JIACG staff member contact and/or liaison responsibility for one or more non-core USG agency or department, in addition to their respective parent agency or department. This liaison responsibility will be achieved through periodic communication. JIACG staffing requirements may change over time, wherein the need for full-time participation from non-core USG agencies or departments may become necessary. At such time, the funding and staffing requirements, terms, and conditions will need to be negotiated between DOD and the relevant, participating USG agency or department.

## APPENDIX D

### REFERENCES

The development of the *Commander's Handbook for the Joint Interagency Coordination Group* is based upon the following primary references.

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5. CJCSM 3500.04D, *Universal Joint Task List (UJTL)*, 1 August 2005 (Directive current as 17 August 2006).
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11. JP 1-02, *Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms*, 12 April 2001 (As Amended Through 17 September 2006).
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13. JP 3-08, *Interagency, Intergovernmental Organization, and Nongovernmental Organization Coordination During Joint Operations, Vol I*, 17 March 2006.
14. JP 3-08, *Interagency, Intergovernmental Organization, and Nongovernmental Organization Coordination During Joint Operations, Vol II*, 17 March 2006.
15. JP 3-13, *Information Operations*, 13 February 2006.

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18. *Inside a U.S. Embassy: How the Foreign Service Works for America*, American Foreign Service Association (AFSA), Washington, DC; latest version, 2006.

# GLOSSARY

## PART I—ABBREVIATIONS AND ACRONYMS

|           |  |
|-----------|--|
| ACT       | advance civilian team  |
| AOR       | area of responsibility   |
| C2        | command and control  |
| CAP       | crisis action planning   |
| CCDR      | combatant commander  |
| CJCSM     | Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff manual   |
| COA       | course of action   |
| COM       | chief of mission   |
| CMO       | civil-military operations  |
| CPG       | contingency planning guidance  |
| CSRG      | country reconstruction and stabilization group   |
| DATT      | defense attaché  |
| DCM       | deputy chief of mission  |
| DHHS      | Department of Health and Human Services  |
| DHS       | Department of Homeland Security  |
| DOC       | Department of Commerce   |
| DOD       | Department of Defense  |
| DOJ       | Department of Justice  |
| DOS       | Department of State  |
| DOTMLPF   | doctrine, organization, training, materiel, leadership and education, personnel and facilities |
| FPA/POLAD | foreign policy advisor/political advisor   |
| HN        | host nation  |
| IA ESC    | interagency executive steering council   |
| IGO       | intergovernmental organization   |
| IO        | information operations   |
| IPC       | integration planning cell  |
| J-3       | operations directorate of a joint staff  |
| J-4       | logistics directorate of a joint staff   |
| J-5       | plans directorate of a joint staff   |
| JDEIS     | Joint Doctrine, Education and Training Electronic Information System                           |
| JFC       | joint force commander  |
| JIACG     | joint interagency coordination group   |
| JOPES     | Joint Operation Planning and Execution System  |
| JP        | joint publication  |
| JS        | Joint Staff  |
| JSCP      | Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan  |
| JTF       | joint task force   |

## Glossary

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|           |  |
|-----------|--|
| NGO       | nongovernmental organization                                   |
| NSC       | National Security Council                                      |
| NSC/DC    | Deputies Committee of the National Security Council            |
| NSC/PC    | National Security Council/Principals Committee                 |
| NSC/PCC   | National Security Council/Policy Coordinating Committee        |
| NSCS      | National Security Council System                               |
| NSPD      | national security Presidential directive                       |
| NSS       | national security strategy                                     |
| OP        | operational task   |
| OPLAN     | operation plan   |
| OPORD     | operation order  |
| OSD       | Office of the Secretary of Defense                             |
| PA        | public affairs   |
| PDD       | Presidential decision directive                                |
| POLMIL    | political-military   |
| SAO       | security assistance office/officer/organization                |
| SCG       | Security Cooperation Guidance                                  |
| S/CRS     | Office of the Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization |
| SecDef    | Secretary of Defense   |
| SES       | senior executive service                                       |
| S/FSO     | senior foreign service officer                                 |
| SJFHQ(CE) | standing joint force headquarters (core element)               |
| SN        | strategic national   |
| ST        | strategic theater  |
| TREAS     | Department of the Treasury                                     |
| UCP       | Unified Command Plan   |
| UJTL      | Universal Joint Task List                                      |
| UN        | United Nations   |
| USAID     | United States Agency for International Development             |
| USDAO     | United States Defense Attaché Office                           |
| USG       | United States Government                                       |
| USJFCOM   | United States Joint Forces Command                             |

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## PART II—TERMS AND DEFINITIONS

**advance civilian team.** Under a combat or crisis scenario, provides an immediate civilian presence in the field to work with military commanders, conduct assessments, engage local authorities, coordinate with international organizations, initiate programs in the field, and prepare for longer-term civilian programs. Under a non-combat scenario, provides similar functions, advising an Ambassador or Chief of Mission and supporting a headquarters staff that augments Embassy operations and coordinates provincial level ACTs. Also called ACT.

**campaign plan.** A joint operation plan for a series of related military operations aimed at accomplishing strategic or operational objectives within a given time and space. (Approved for inclusion in the next edition of JP 1-02)

**civil-military operations.** The activities of a commander that establish, maintain, influence, or exploit relations between military forces, governmental and nongovernmental civilian organizations and authorities, and the civilian populace in a friendly, neutral, or hostile operational area in order to facilitate military operations, to consolidate and achieve operational US objectives. Civil-military operations may include performance by military forces of activities and functions normally the responsibility of the local, regional, or national government. These activities may occur prior to, during, or subsequent to other military actions. They may also occur, if directed, in the absence of other military operations. Civil-military operations may be performed by designated civil affairs, by other military forces, or by a combination of civil affairs and other forces. Also called CMO. (JP 1-02)

**command and control.** The exercise of authority and direction by a properly designated commander over assigned and attached forces in the accomplishment of the mission. Command and control functions are performed through an arrangement of personnel, equipment, communications, facilities, and procedures employed by a commander in planning, directing, coordinating, and controlling forces and operations in the accomplishment of the mission. Also called C2. (JP 1-02)

**contingency planning.** The Joint Operation Planning and Execution System planning activities that occur in noncrisis situations. The Joint Planning and Execution Community uses contingency planning to develop operation plans for a broad range of contingencies based on requirements identified in the Contingency Planning Guidance, Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan, or other planning directive. Contingency planning underpins and facilitates the transition to crisis action planning. (Approved for inclusion in the next edition of JP 1-02)

**country reconstruction and stabilization group.** Serves as the main interagency coordination body for comprehensive USG engagement in a post-conflict or complex contingency. The National Security Council establishes a CRSG upon the recommendation of the Secretary of State. The CRSG oversees strategic planning and implementation of USG policy and programs for reconstruction and stabilization in the region of engagement, prepares options for senior leadership, and reports to the Deputies Committee. Also called CRSG.

**course of action.** 1. Any sequence of activities that an individual or unit may follow. 2. A possible plan open to an individual or commander that would accomplish, or is related to the accomplishment of the mission. 3. The scheme adopted to accomplish a job or mission. 4. A line of conduct in an engagement. 5. A product of the Joint Operation Planning and Execution System concept development phase and the course-of-action determination step of the joint operation planning process. Also called COA. (Approved for inclusion in the next edition of JP 1-02)

**crisis action planning.** One of the two types of joint operation planning. The Joint Operation Planning and Execution System process involving the time-sensitive development of joint operation plans and operation orders for the deployment, employment, and sustainment of assigned and allocated forces and resources in response to an imminent crisis. Crisis action planning is based on the actual circumstances that exist at the time planning occurs. Also called CAP. (Approved for inclusion in the next edition of JP 1-02)

**defense support to public diplomacy.** Those activities and measures taken by the Department of Defense components to support and facilitate public diplomacy efforts of the United States Government. Also called DSPD. (JP 1-02)

**information management.** The function of managing an organization's information resources by the handling of knowledge acquired by one or many different individuals and organizations in a way that optimizes access by all who have a share in that knowledge or a right to that knowledge. (JP 1-02.)

**information operations.** The integrated employment of the core capabilities of electronic warfare, computer network operations, psychological operations, military deception, and operations security, in concert with specified supporting and related capabilities, to influence, disrupt, corrupt or usurp adversarial human and automated decision making while protecting our own. Also called IO. (JP 1-02)

**integration planning cell.** This civilian State Department team will address the need for coordination between military and civilian planners when US military engagement is contemplated. It will operate at the locus of planning for a geographical combatant commander to ensure unity of effort on reconstruction and stability operations, to resolve assumption gaps about capabilities, and to advise the commander on reconstruction and stability matters and on the connections between the military plan and longer-term civilian plans. The IPC will not have authority to commit resources but to develop plans that decision-makers can consider knowing they have been developed in coordination with the military. An adapted IPC may be deployed to a planning cell for a non-combat scenario, e.g. to the planning staff of a UN peacekeeping operation. Also called IPC.

**interagency.** United States Government agencies and departments, including the Department of Defense. See also interagency coordination. (JP 1-02)

**interagency coordination.** Within the context of Department of Defense involvement, the coordination that occurs between elements of Department of Defense, and engaged US Government agencies for the purpose of achieving an objective. (JP 1-02)

**interagency executive steering council.** A senior-level interagency group that meets periodically (monthly to quarterly) to establish a common understanding between military and civilian organizations on key coordination issues. Normally located at the combatant command level. Also called IA ESC

**intergovernmental organization.** An organization created by a formal agreement (e.g. a treaty) between two or more governments. It may be established on a global, regional, or functional basis for wide-ranging or narrowly defined purposes. Formed to protect and promote national interests shared by member states. Examples include the United Nations, North Atlantic Treaty Organization, and the African Union. Also called IGO. (JP 1-02)

**joint force commander.** A general term applied to a combatant commander, subunified commander, or joint task force commander authorized to exercise combatant command (command authority) or operational control over a joint force. Also called JFC. (JP 1-02)

**joint interagency coordination group.** An interagency staff group that establishes regular, timely, and collaborative working relationships between civilian and military operational planners. Composed of US Government civilian and military experts accredited to the combatant commander and tailored to meet the requirements of a supported combatant commander, the joint interagency coordination group provides the combatant commander with the capability to collaborate at the operational level with other US Government civilian agencies and departments. Also called JIACG. (JP 1-02)

**joint operation planning.** Planning activities associated with joint military operations by combatant commanders and their subordinate joint force commanders in response to contingencies and crises. Joint operation planning includes planning for the mobilization, deployment, employment, sustainment, redeployment, and demobilization of joint forces. (Approved for inclusion in the next edition of JP 1-02)

**joint task force.** A joint force that is constituted and so designated by the Secretary of Defense, a combatant commander, a subunified commander, or an existing joint task force commander. Also called a JTF. (JP 1-02)

**nongovernmental organizations.** A private, self-governing, not-for-profit organization dedicated to alleviating human suffering; and/or promoting education, health care, economic development, environmental protection, human rights, and conflict resolution; and/or encouraging the establishment of democratic institutions and civil society. Also called NGOs. (JP 1-02)

**operational environment.** A composite of the conditions, circumstances, and influences that affect the employment of capabilities and bear on the decisions of the commander. (JP 1-02)

**public affairs.** Those public information, command information, and community relations activities directed toward both the external and internal publics with interest in the Department of Defense (DOD). (JP 1-02)

**security cooperation planning.** The subset of joint strategic planning conducted to support the Department of Defense's security cooperation program. This planning supports a combatant commander's theater strategy. (Approved for inclusion in the next edition of JP 1-02)

**strategic communication.** Focused United States Government (USG) efforts to understand and engage key audiences in order to create, strengthen or preserve conditions favorable for the advancement of USG interests, policies, and objectives through the use of coordinated programs, plans, themes, messages, and products synchronized with the actions of all elements of national power. (JP 1-02)

**unified action.** A broad generic term that describes the wide scope of actions (including the synchronization and/or integration of joint or multinational military operations with the activities of local, state, and federal government agencies and intergovernmental and nongovernmental organizations) taking place within unified commands, subordinate unified commands, or joint task forces under the overall direction of the commanders of those commands. (This term and its definition are provided for information and are proposed for inclusion in the next edition of JP 1-02 by JP 1.)



