

EXHIBIT OLN-178

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MEMORANDUM

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

SYSTEM II
91097

October 22, 1984

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ACTION

NOTE

MEMORANDUM FOR ROBERT C. MCFARLANE

FROM: OLIVER L. NORTH

SUBJECT: FDN Manual on Psychological Warfare

EXHIBIT
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ADM Poindexter asked that you be provided with the four portions of the FDN Psychological Warfare Manual which contain objectionable material. Attached at Tab A are the relevant passages on pages 23, 24, 25, 26, 51, and 52 of the CIA's English translation from the original draft. The notes below are pertinent to the points in each section as indicated by underlining:

-- Page 23-24, "Shooting a Citizen." This is guidance to forces in the field who, presented with a potential compromise, are instructed on how to react. This should not be interpreted as guidance to kill civilians, but rather how to handle an incident once it has occurred. Obviously, a guerrilla force operating deep inside enemy territory cannot afford to be compromised. This section was not removed in either the FDN version or the CIA printing.

-- Page 25-26, "Selective Use of Violence for Neutralization." The word neutralize appears only in the version translated from the Spanish FDN document. The original phrase in Spanish "puden neutralizarse" was put in the manual by the author from his Special Forces (JFK Center) lesson plan which had the word "remove" instead of "neutralize."

The specific intent in psychological warfare operations is to intimidate through minimum violence and thereby convince or coerce the enemy into a position of ineffectiveness or defection. Since this concept was difficult to translate into Spanish from the original English, the author used a Spanish phrase which now has been translated back into English as "neutralize."

It must be accepted that a minimum amount of violence is necessary in order to convince the adversary that he is indeed in jeopardy, if he does not comply with the wishes of the resistance. Since this manual was used both for training and as a political action/psychological warfare tool, it was important that the FSLN perceive that they were indeed threatened by potential violence.

Partially Declassified/Reclassified on 4/26/1997
under Provisions of E.O. 12356
By B. Reiter, National Security Council

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Finally, it should be noted that NSDD-138 specifically refers to "neutralizing" terrorist groups and movements as acceptable within the provisions of Executive Order 12333. 29961 We chose this word specifically because it met our requirements, short of the prohibitions contained in the E.O. This section was not removed in either the FDN version or the CIA printing.

- Page 51, "Use of Professional Criminals." This section was removed verbatim from the lesson plan used at the JFK Center and is standard when there are undesirable activities which need to be performed, but which will not point back to the resistance movement. For example, in a locale dependent on propane gas deliveries via truck transportation it may best to have a "known criminal element" blamed for destroying the shipment rather than the resistance forces. The same can be said for bank robberies which help to finance the movement and deny the Sandinistas currency. It is also useful to demonstrate the inability of the local government to control criminal behavior/activity. This section was removed en toto in the CIA version and revised the earlier FDN version to show that these functions would be performed by "activists" rather than "professional criminals."
- Page 51-52, "Martyrs for the Cause." The manual calls for the propaganda teams to instigate disturbances/demonstrations which would lead the authorities (the Sandinistas) to react with violence. In these circumstances the psychological warfare teams are instructed to take advantage of this situation so that those who are injured/killed by the Sandinistas are portrayed as martyrs to the cause. Taken in the context of the overall document, this is not an odious exhortation. It should be expected that the resistance would indeed create, through political action, situations which the Sandinistas could only control through violence. The manual simply instructs on how to exploit this situation. The FDN deleted this section in its entirety from their version. The CIA printing left this passage unchanged.

After the briefing yesterday, Senator Wallop expressed dismay that the briefers [redacted] were "two new guys" and not those who had been involved in the project until October 1, 1984. The Director has dispatched Claire George and [redacted] to meet with Senators Goldwater and Wallop in Phoenix tonight. He also noted that the Agency was "too defensive" and "too ready to apologize." He also noted that Senator Munn was prepared to "believe our story" but that the case had not been particularly well presented. [redacted]

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Yesterday, when I asked Wallop if he could make a statement along the lines of "I have reviewed the preliminary investigation and do not see, from what has been presented so far, any evidence of wrong doing. I am withholding further judgement until the investigation is completed and would urge others to do the same." Wallop expressed consternation that no one had asked him to make this statement before he met with the press following the briefing. As it is, his statements have been rather non-committal. He has, however, supported our position that "neutralize" does not mean "assassinate."

At this point, it would appear that we have two courses of action:

- Encourage Goldwater and Wallop to issue a statement along the lines indicated above and hope that Moynihan and Hunn would follow suit, or at least say nothing.
- Cause a friendly expert on psychological warfare/propaganda to publish a defense of the manual en toto, placing each of the offensive sections in context.

Director Casey's talking points at Tab B were developed along those lines. Although he and I and his task force personnel worked on this in concert, the talking points ignore the coercive effect PSY OPS are designed to have on the adversary. The fact that scores of these documents were inserted into Nicaragua by balloon and airdrop adds to the credibility of apparent harshness in its tone. Unless the Sandinistas believe that they are in jeopardy, that the FDN is capable of violence; then there is no threat. It would seem then that we should pursue both courses of action indicated above, if the story does not go away by mid-week. If, on the other hand, the matter is no longer making the front pages by Thursday, we should stop briefing and backgrounding until the IG and IOB inquiries are completed and their reports are submitted.

RECOMMENDATION

That you review the points above and the attachments and pursue the course indicated above.

Approve _____

Disapprove _____

cc: Ken deGraffenreid

Attachments

- Tab A - Pages 23, 24, 25, 26, 51, and 52 CIA English Translation of FDN Manual
- Tab B - CIA Talking Points

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- Explain to the population that first of all this is being done to protect them, the people, not the guerrillas themselves. H 29963

- Admit frankly and publicly that this is "an act of democratic guerrillas," with the appropriate explanations.

- That this action, although not desirable, is necessary because the final objective of the insurrection is a free and democratic society, where acts of force are not necessary.

- The force of arms is a need provoked by the oppressive system, and will cease to exist when the "forces of justice" of our movement assume control.

- If, for example, it became necessary for one of the advance posts to have to shoot a citizen who was trying to leave the town or city in which the guerrillas are carrying out armed propaganda or political proselytism, the following is recommended:

- Explain that if this citizen were able to escape, he would alert the enemy near the town or city, and they would come in with reprisals such as rape, pillage, destruction, captures, etc., terrorizing the inhabitants of the place for having been attentive and hospitable to the guerrillas in the town.

- If a guerrilla shoots an individual, make the population see that he was an enemy of the people, and that they shot him because the guerrillas recognized their primordial duty, which is protecting the citizens.

- The commando tried to stop the informant without shooting, because he, like all Christian guerrillas, advocate non-violence. Having shot the Sandinista informer, although it is against his own will, was necessary to avoid repression on the part of the Sandinista government against the innocent people.

- Make the population see that it was the regime's repressive system, which caused this situation, that really killed the informant, and that the weapon

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fired was one that was recovered in combat against the Sandinista regime.

- Make the population see that if the Sandinista regime had ended ~~had~~ 20964 repression, with the corruption sponsored by foreign powers, etc., the freedom commandos would not have had to take up arms to cut down the lives of their Nicaraguan brothers, which hurts our Christian feelings. If the informant had not tried to escape, he would be enjoying life together with the rest of the population, because he would not have tried to inform to the enemy. This death would have been avoided if justice and freedom existed in Nicaragua, and this is exactly the objective of the democratic guerrilla.

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5. Selective Use of Violence for Propaganda Effects H 29965

We could neutralize carefully selected and planned-for targets, such as court judges, cattle judges (jueces de mesta), police or state security officers, CDS chiefs, etc. For purposes of the psychological effect, it is necessary to take extreme precautions, and it is essential to gather the affected population together to attend, take part in the act, and formulate accusations against the oppressor.

The target or person must be selected on the basis of the following:

- The spontaneous hostility which the majority of the population may feel against the target.
- Using potential rejection or hate on the part of the majority of the affected population against the target, rousing the population and making them see all of the individual's negative and hostile acts against the people.
- If the majority of the people supports or backs the target, don't try to change these feelings through provocation.
- Relative difficulty of handling the person who will replace the target.

The person who will replace the target must be selected carefully, on the basis of the following:

- Degree of violence necessary to effect the change.
- Degree of violence acceptable to the affected population.
- Degree of violence possible without causing damage or danger to other individuals in the area around the target.
- Foreseeable degree of reprisals on the part of the enemy towards the affected population or other individuals in the area around the target.

The mission of replacing the individual must be followed by:

- Extensive explanations to the affected population of why (this action)

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was necessary for the good of the people.

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- Explaining that the Sandinista reprisals are unfair, indiscriminate, and above all, a justification for the execution of this mission.
- Carefully sounding out the reaction of the people to the mission, as well as controlling this reaction by assuring that the population's reaction is beneficial to the Freedom Commandos.

6. Conclusions

Armed propaganda includes all actions performed and the impact achieved by an armed force, resulting in positive attitudes on the part of the population towards that force, not including forced indoctrination. However, armed propaganda is the most effective instrument available to a guerrilla force.

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~~one~~ (Cadre.) will be mobilized in the largest number possible, together with individuals who have been affected by the communist ^{dictatorship} dictatorship, whether it be that they have been robbed of their possessions, imprisoned, tortured or experienced any other type of aggression against themselves. They will mobilize to the areas where the (criminal) and hostile elements of the PSLM, (CDS) and others live, making an effort to (go armed) with clubs, iron (bars), placards, and if possible small arms, which they will carry concealed.

If possible, professional criminals will be hired to carry out specific selective "jobs."

Our agitator will visit the villages where unemployed individuals may be present, as well as unemployment offices, in order to hire them for unspecified "jobs." The recruitment of the (.....) ^{unemployed?} individuals is necessary because it creates a nucleus under absolute orders.

The designated cadres will arrange in advance the transportation of the participants so as to take them to the meeting places in private or public vehicles, boats or any other means of transportation.

Other cadres will be designated to make placards, flags and banners with different types of slogans or watchwords, be they of the partial, transitory or of the more radical type.

Other cadres will be designated to prepare leaflets, posters, handbills and pamphlets so as to make the meetings more colorful. This material will contain instructions for the participants, and will also be useful against the regime.

Specific jobs will be assigned to other elements in order to create a

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~~secret~~ for the cause, leading the demonstrators into a confrontation with authorities, so as to provoke riots or shootings which may cause the death of one or more persons who would become martyrs, a situation which should be taken advantage of immediately against the regime so as to create greater conflicts.

6. Way of Carrying Out an Uprising in Mass Meetings

(It may be) affected by means of a small group of guerrillas infiltrated among the masses, those who will have the mission of agitating, giving the impression that they are numerous and that they have extensive popular support. Employing the tactics of a force of 200 to 300 agitators, a demonstration can be created in which 10,000 to 20,000 persons take part.

Agitation of the masses in a demonstration is carried out by means of socio-political objectives. One or several agents from our covert movement, highly trained as mass agitators, should participate in this action, involving innocent persons so as to provoke an apparently spontaneous protest demonstration. These individuals will direct the entire meeting until its conclusion.

External command. This group stays out of all activities, situated in such a way that it is able to observe the unfolding of the planned events from where it is stationed. As observation point, for example, he should look for a church steeple, a tall building, a tall tree, the highest tier of the stadium or an auditorium, or any other high place.

Internal Command. This individual will remain inside the crowd. Great importance should be given to protect the leaders of these indivi-

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